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ABSTRACT
“Foreign policy is the face a nation wears to the world. The aim is the same for 
all states - the protection of national integrity and interest. But the manner in which a 
state conceives and conducts its foreign policy is greatly affected by national 
peculiarities.” 1 The focus of this thesis is to illuminate the national peculiarities that have 
put a unique face on American foreign policy. I will examine the two basic tenets, or 
impulses, that have characterized U.S. foreign policy development: the Jeffersonian, or 
idealist, impulse and the Hamiltonian, or realist, impulse. My purpose is to show that 
each impulse is inextricably intertwined in the political psyche of the American people 
and their leaders. It is my contention that the key to successful foreign policy is finding 
the right balance between these two essential threads of American political history and 
tradition.
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“The study o f history offers no manual of instructions that can be applied 
automatically; history teaches by analogy, shedding light on the likely 
consequences o f comparable situations. But each generation must 
determine for itself which circumstances are in fact comparable.”2
Henry Kissinger
The study o f the affairs between nations has engaged many great minds, provoked 
endless debates , and filled countless volumes that crowd the shelves o f untold libraries 
and archives. A deep and thorough understanding o f foreign affairs has, however, been 
illusory at best. Far too many scholars and policy makers have oversimplified the 
complex and dynamic interaction o f people, institutions and environment that provide 
both the stimulus and the mechanism for the conduct of foreign affairs. Scholars and 
academicians have gone to great effort to build models and paradigms to accurately 
identify the “laws” of political science in much the same manner as the natural sciences 
such as physics or chemistry. The diversity, complexity, and unpredictability o f humans 
have foiled most attempts at this type o f categorization and analysis. Arthur M.
2 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 27.
1
2Schlesinger provides a telling appraisal of the dilemma facing political scientists: “the 
simplifications of doctrine are forever at war with the complexity of reality.” The 
dramatic events o f 1989 and 1990: the dismantling o f the Berlin Wall; the reunification of 
the German state; and, the dissolution of the Soviet Union were inconceivable, yet 
occurred in the face of almost unanimous expert opinion.
Does this make the study o f political science futile or irrelevant? Not in the least! 
In fact, faced with such a dynamic and unpredictable environment, decisionmankers need 
to have a deeper understanding of how people, institutions, and their environment interact 
in order to make sound and effective policy decisions. Henry Kissinger, having been 
both a statesman and an academician, provides a perceptive insight into the challenges 
faced by our leaders as they search for a compass to guide them through the complex and 
challenging environment o f the post-Cold War world.
“Intellectuals analyze the operations of international systems; statesmen 
build them. And there is a vast difference between the perspective o f an 
analyst and that o f a statesmen. The analyst can choose which problem he 
wishes to study, whereas the statesman’s problems are imposed on him.
The analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear 
conclusion; the overwhelming challenge to the statesman is the pressure of 
time. The analyst runs no risk. If his conclusions prove wrong, he can 
write another treatise. The statesman is permitted only one guess; his 
mistakes are irretrievable. The analyst has available to him all the facts; he 
will be judged on his intellectual power. The statesman must act on 
assessments that cannot be proved at the time that he is making them; he
3 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., p. 67.
3will be judged by history on the basis o f how wisely he managed the 
inevitable change, and above all, by how well he preserves the peace.”4
Upon what should we as a nation base our foreign policy decisions? When do we 
involve ourselves and what actions do we take? When is it best not to act? These are 
some of the questions that elected and unelected officials have to face squarely every day. 
The advent o f computers and near real-time journalism have only compounded an already 
monumental task for the decision makers and compressed the time in which they have to 
assess the situation, formulate a response, and act. I firmly believe the relationship 
between scholars, politicians, and the public they serve should be a cooperative, rather 
than a competitive one. Academicians should study with the intent to enlighten and guide 
the politicians who develop and execute policies which affect the daily lives o f the public 
that elect them.
What should guide the policy makers who must chart a course through the 
turbulent waters o f the international political arena? What instruction book do they use to 
determine what role America should play in the game o f nations? The answer can be 
found in a journey back to the wellspring o f American political thought: the wisdom and 
genius of the Republic’s Founding Fathers. We must strive to find the answer to the
4 Kissinger, pp. 27-28.
4famous question posed by J. Hector St. John Crevecoeur in 1782; “What then is the
American, this new man?” Only by getting to the very essence o f what it is that makes us
uniquely American can we begin to understand the American approach to foreign policy
development. Crevecoeur’s answer to his own question provides an appropriate starting
point for our journey o f self-discovery.
“He is an American, who, leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices 
and manners, receives new ones from the new mode o f life he has 
embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank that he 
holds...Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race o f men, 
whose labor and prosperity will one day cause great changes in the world. 
Americans are the western pilgrims, who are carrying with them that great 
mass o f arts, sciences, vigor, and industry which began long since in the 
east; they will finish the great circle...The American is a new man, who 
acts upon new principles; he must therefore entertain new ideas, and form 
new opinions.”
The basic premise of this thesis will be to illustrate that for any foreign policy 
decision to be ultimately successful it must pass what Kissinger refers to as the “acid 
test”; it must be supported by the public it is intended to benefit. The ultimate goal of 
this thesis is to show that gaining public support hinges upon finding an acceptable 
balance between the two pillars of American political history and tradition; the idealistic
5 J. Hector St. John Crevecoeur, Letters From an American Farmer, (1782), Letter III. The point that 
Crevecoeur is opening our minds to is that this “new man”, the American, has a new vision and a new 
worldview that is truly unique and distinct. In my opinion, it is this uniqueness that is the cornerstone of 
the American approach to foreign policy. This distinctness and, more importantly, our perception o f  that 
distinctness, is an inescapable reality that has embedded itself in the political mindset o f  the American 
people.
views exhorted and exemplified by Thomas Jefferson; and, the more realistic views 
professed by Alexander Hamilton. The debate begun by these two men has raged since 
the beginning o f this great nation. The question o f whether the United States should build 
and conduct its foreign affairs in a manner totally distinct from the other nations o f the 
world, or whether it should act like one nation among many is a basic one and provides 
the fuel for the continuing argument between the realists and the idealists. The first area 
that will be addressed in this thesis is a discussion of idealism and realism in terms of 
foreign policy development. The two terms are used so frequently that their meanings 
have been clouded and confused over time and it will be essential to establish a solid 
working definition o f those two concepts at the outset o f this paper.
Once these concepts have been developed, they will be examined in relation to the 
peculiarities o f the American political experience beginning with the debates between the 
Republicans, led by Thomas Jefferson, and the Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton. 
The Jeffersonians adhered predominantly to the idealistic view o f America as essentially 
distinct and different from the other nations, charged with the responsibility to be a 
beacon o f democracy for the rest o f the world. The Hamiltonians espoused the more 
realistic philosophy that the new nation’s role in the world be defined primarily in terms 
o f national interest and power politics. After a thorough investigation o f the foundations 
of this great debate, I will trace its development over time to show how amazingly
6consistent the premises o f these two great men have been over the course o f American 
history.
By viewing the Jeffersonian/Hamiltonian debate over the course o f time, it will 
become apparent that American foreign policy has ebbed and flowed between its 
idealistic and realistic tendencies, being dominated more by the Jeffersonian than by the 
Hamiltonian. Hans J. Morgenthau argued that American decision makers have placed far 
too much emphasis on idealistic wishful thinking, rather than critical examination o f what 
was in the national interest o f the United States. He contended that this proclivity 
towards idealism over national interest was a fundamental weakness o f American foreign 
policy, especially in the twentieth century. I concur with Morgenthau’s basic contention, 
but believe the real weakness is not in choosing one over the other, but rather in not 
finding the proper balance between these two pillars o f the American political psyche. 
Richard Nixon, in Seize The Moment: America's Challenge in a One-Superpower World, 
captures the essential fact I want to develop in this chapter:
“Idealism has at once been our greatest strength and greatest weakness. 
American idealism - sometimes naive, sometimes misguided, sometimes 
overzealous - has always been at the center o f our foreign policy. On the 
one hand, it has at times fostered a profound impulse toward isolationism.
More comfortable with black-and-white moral choices than with the 
inevitable gray areas o f world politics, we have often opted into 
isolationism in order to avoid tainting our idealism with the realities of 
power politics. On the other hand, this idealism has served as an
7indispensable foundation to sustain our commitment to the great moral 
causes o f the twentieth century. It has enabled us to lead not on the basis 
o f narrow and selfish interests but through the appeal of high ideals and 
common values. When untempered by realism, our idealism has caused 
our foreign policy to swing between ideological crusades and short-sighted 
isolationism. When combined with hard-headed realism, America’s 
idealism has left a record of world leadership that no nation, past or 
present, can match.”6
This assessment o f the inherent duality in American foreign policy is central to my main 
argument that the defining impulses of Jefferson and Hamilton are both inextricably 
embedded in the American body politic, and the key to a successful and sustainable 
foreign policy lies in finding the proper balance between the two.
The Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars provide a unique and effective backdrop 
from which to examine the interplay of these two defining tenets, interest and idealism, 
and the necessity o f balancing them to develop a successful and sustainable U.S. foreign 
policy. No foreign policy decision evokes as much public emotion and debate than the 
commitment of American troops, and it is my firm contention that the ultimate success of 
such an important foreign policy decision is whether or not the public supports such a 
decision. The failure o f Vietnam highlights the danger o f excessive idealism. The “pay 
any price, bear any burden” mentality of the era played a crucial role in the United States
6 Richard M. Nixon, Seize The Moment: America's Challenge in a One-Superpower World, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1992), pp. 274-75.
deciding to intervene in Vietnam. Hans J. Morgenthau, in Vietnam and the United States 
argued that had the United States evaluated a military action in Vietnam in terms o f 
national interest, we would have never sent troops to Vietnam7. The war with Iraq 
contrasts sharply with Vietnam in terms of the role of national interest in U.S. foreign 
policy decisionmaking. The strategic importance of oil reserves and their impact on the 
world economy provided a clear impetus for action, but President Bush quickly found out 
that public support for military action would have to be balanced with a more idealistic, 
moral purpose. Fighting for oil was replaced with turning back the aggression of the 
“Hitler o f the Middle East” . I firmly believe the Bush administration succeeded where 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations failed because he found an acceptable balance 
between the idealistic and realistic impulses inherent to the American political tradition 
and, more importantly, was successful in communicating it to the public.
I want to conclude the thesis by looking into the future with a foot in the past. 
Has the end o f the Cold War changed the political landscape so drastically that the 
Jeffersonian/Hamiltonian debate has lost its significance and relevance? Given the 
turbulent and unpredictable nature o f the emerging world order, it is crucial to 
reinvigorate the debate to help us focus again on “what is the American, this new man?”. 
The idealism o f Jefferson tempered by the realism of Hamilton will be the compass that
7 Hans J. Morgenthau, Vietnam and the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965)
will help the leaders o f this great nation navigate the dangerous waters that lie ahead as 
we approach the next millennium. Only by tracing our political roots can we provide a 
roadmap for the future.
CHAPTER TWO
THE FOUNDATION OF FOREIGN POLICY: NATIONAL INTEREST
EXPLORED
“As long as the world is politically organized into nations, the national 
interest is indeed the last word in world politics”
Hans J Morgenthau
“No nation is to be trusted farther than it is bound by its interests.”9
George Washington
In the aftermath o f the Second World War, Hans J. Morgenthau addresses the 
quintessential question o f why a nation goes to war. “During the most recent war the 
ideologues o f the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, and the United Nations were 
constantly complaining that the American soldier did not know what he was fighting for. 
Indeed, if he was fighting for some utopian ideal, divorced from concrete experiences and
H Hans J. Morgenthau, “Another Great Debate: The National Interest o f  the United States”, The American  
Political Science Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, (December 1952), p. 972.
’ George Washington to Henry Lawrens, 14 November 1778, in Writings, ed. J.C. Fitzpatrick,
(Washington, D.C., 1936), Vol. XIII, p. 256.
10
the interests o f the country, then the complaint was well grounded. However, if he was 
fighting for the territorial integrity o f the nation and for its survival as a free country 
where he could live, think, and act as he pleased, then he had never any doubt about what 
he was fighting for.” (my emphasis) Morgenthau goes on to state that ideological 
rationalizations and justifications are necessary and healthy adjuncts o f all political 
action, but warns that there is “something unhealthy in a craving for ideological 
intoxication and in the inability to act and to see merit in action except under the 
stimulant o f grandiose ideas and far-fetched schemes”. Talking about the American 
public, he says that “...ideologues and demagogues can sway him by appealing to his 
emotions. But it is also true, as American history shows in abundance...that responsible 
statesmen can guide him by awakening his latent understanding o f the national
" ,  x 9) I 0interest.
The most basic building block o f any foreign policy is national interest. Yet, what 
is national interest? How do we define it, and, more importantly, how do we give it the 
content it will need to make it a useful guide for action? By its very definition, national 
interest must derive its content from the physical, political, and cultural entity known as a 
nation. The concept of nations and national interest began to emerge in the mid­
10 Morgenthau, “Another Great Debate”, p. 971.
seventeenth century as the medieval acceptance of universality waned. Universality was 
a concept o f world order that represented a blending o f the traditions o f the Roman 
Empire and the Catholic Church. The world was viewed as representing Heaven on 
Earth. Just as God rules in Heaven, so one emperor would rule over the secular world, 
and one Pope over the Universal Church. With the advent o f the Reformation, the 
hegemony o f the Holy Roman Empire began to collapse and the emerging states of 
Europe needed some principle to regulate and guide their relations. They found their 
answers in raison d’etat and the balance of power. Raison d’etat, or reason o f state, 
asserted that the well being o f the state justified whatever means were necessary to 
further itself. The national interest supplanted the medieval notion o f universal morality 
based on loyalty to the emperor and the Church. The balance o f power replaced the 
nostalgia for a universal monarchy with the belief that each state, in pursuing its own 
selfish interests would ultimately result in a state o f equilibrium that would contribute to 
the safety and progress o f the others.
France, one of the first nation-states to emerge in Europe, was the first to practice 
this revolutionary approach to foreign affairs. The principle agent for this French policy 
was Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal Richelieu, first Minister o f France from 1624 - 
1642. Richelieu has been credited with being the father o f the modern state system. He 
built French foreign policy around raison d’etat and practiced it relentlessly. In the
course o f the next century, it would become the modus operandi o f all the European
states. Central to the concept of raison d’etat is the idea that although man’s duty is to
God, the duty o f the state is to the man. According to Richelieu, “Man is immortal, his
salvation is the hereafter. The state has no immortality, its salvation is now or never.” 11
Thus, the moral duty o f the nation is distinct and different than the moral duty o f its
citizens. States are not rewarded by doing what is right, but rather are rewarded by doing
what is necessary to survive. Another essential truth o f national interest addressed by
Richelieu is the idea o f proportionality in conducting the affairs of state. “Logic,” he
wrote in his Political Testament, “requires that the thing to be supported and the force
12that is to support it should stand in geometric proportion to each other.” In other 
words, is the prize worth the price you will have to pay to get it. Determining the costs, 
benefits, and the risks o f foreign policy decisions is central to notion o f national interest.
An inherent danger in raison d’etat, as promulgated by Richelieu, is it has no built 
in limitations. At what point would the state’s interests be satisfied? When would a state 
consider itself completely secure? Raison d’etat provided a rationale for the behavior of 
individual states, but provided no answer to the challenge o f maintaining order between
11 Joseph Strayer, Hans Gatzke, and E Harris Hurbison, The Mainstream o f  Civilization Since 1500, (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jonanovich, 1971), p. 420, quoted in Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 61.
12 Quoted in Carl J. Burkhardt, Richelieu and His Age, trans. from the German by Bernard Hoy, (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jonanovich, 1970), Vol. Ill, “Power Politics and the Cardinal’s Death”, p. 61.
states. As raison d ’etat evolved, so did the idea o f a balance o f power. Under this new 
guise, states were no longer restrained by the pretense o f a moral code. If the good of the 
state was tantamount, the duty of the ruler was to the aggrandizement o f himself and his 
nation. The stronger states, such as France, would try to dominate, and the weaker 
nations would from coalitions to thwart the advances of the more dominant. If the 
coalition was strong enough, a balance o f power was achieved, if not, hegemony would 
result. This new system inaugurated and postulated by Cardinal Richelieu would be 
tested by frequent wars as nations attempted to advance their interests at the expense of 
their neighbors.
England played an interesting role in this emerging system. England was the one 
European country whose raison d ’etat did not require it to expand its territory into 
continental Europe. Perceiving its national interest to be in the preservation o f the 
European balance o f power, it sought only to prevent the domination o f Europe by a 
single power. England clearly understood that a European continent dominated by a 
single power would threaten the very existence of the tiny island nation. England 
pursued its foreign policy with self preservation as the guiding principle. Territorial 
integrity and survival as a political entity is the very essence o f national interest. 
Ultimately, a balance o f power emerged as shifting coalitions under British leadership
were developed to prevent French attempts to conquer Europe in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and Germany in the twentieth century.
The history o f American foreign policy closely parallels that of England, as our 
involvement in two world wars, and the Cold War, was based on that very premise. Even 
the Founding Fathers recognized that the preservation o f a European balance o f power 
served the interests of our infant nation. “There is a Ballance o f Power in Europe,” wrote 
John Adams. “Nature has formed it. Practice and Habit have confirmed it and it must 
exist forever. It may be disturbed for a time, by the accidental Removal o f a Weight from 
one Scale to the other; but there will be a continual Effort to restore the Equilibrium ... 
Congress adopted these Principles and this System in its purity.” 13 Even Thomas 
Jefferson, who personally loathed the British, would not let his personal beliefs cloud his 
perception o f what he believed was in the best interest of America. In 1814, while in the 
throws o f war with England, Jefferson could not even look favorably on Napoleon’s 
successes against our common antagonist. “It cannot be to our interest that all Europe 
should be reduced to a single monarchy,” Jefferson wrote, “... Were he again advanced to 
Moscow, I should again wish him such disaster as would prevent his reaching Petersburg. 
And were the consequences even to be the longer continuance o f our war [with England],
11 John Adams to James Warren, March 20, 1783, in James H. Hutson, “ Intellectual Foundations o f Early 
American Diplomacy”, Diplomatic History, (W inter 1977), p. 13.
I would rather meet them than see the whole force o f Europe wielded by a single hand.” 14 
Although frequently maligned by the Founding Fathers, Cardinal Richelieu’s principles 
o f national interest and balance o f power, were nonetheless understood and utilized by the 
same men that publically loathed them. Jefferson, as the above quote indicates, was a 
complex and often contradictory personality who defies simple categorization. Even 
Hans J. Morgenthau described Jefferson as “thinking in terms o f moral principles, but 
acting in terms of power politics.” 15 It should never be doubted that Jefferson based his 
foreign policy decisions on the realistic premise of American national interest in its purest 
form - survival as a nation. Although national interest was the impetus o f his foreign 
policy, it was Jefferson’s idealistic vision of America as truly distinct among nations that 
guided his actions in developing a foreign policy to protect the infant nation.
This was the ancien regime, the Europe o f the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, that the Founding Fathers sought to distance themselves from as they built a 
new nation. They believed that the system itself was the cause o f the seemingly endless 
wars and conflicts in Europe, and they wanted no part o f it. The Founding Fathers 
wanted to exempt themselves from this game played by monarchs and despots. America, 
a nation o f free men, would take a new and different direction. This sentiment is clearly
M As quoted in Norman A. Graebner, ed., Ideas and Diplomacy, (New York, 1964), pp. 93, 122-123.
15 Mans J. Morgenthau, In Defense o f  the National Interest: A Critical Examination o f  American Foreign 
Policy, (Washington, D.C.: University Press o f America, 1982), p. 13.
evident in Washington’s warning to the American people in his farewell address. 
“Europe has a set o f primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. 
Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the concerns o f which are 
essentially foreign to our concerns... therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate 
ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes o f her [European] politics, or the 
ordinary combinations and collusions o f her friendships or enmities. Our detached and 
distant situation invites us to follow a different course.”16 This warning by our first 
president has been a source of much misunderstanding among historians and political 
scientists. Many argued that the Founding Fathers were rejecting the very concept of 
national interest as the basis for American foreign affairs. Washington, as well as the 
other Founding Fathers, understood that interest was the compass that would guide the 
new republic in its dealings with other nations. “No nation is to be trusted farther than it 
is bound by its interests.” 17 The early architects were not rejecting the concept o f national 
interest, but rather were rejecting the European governments and how they practiced it.
America was a different nation, something completely new under the sun, but still 
was a nation among others. Pursuing the national interest was not a game o f chess where 
the people were sacrificed as the pawns of the powerful, but rather protecting this new
16 Ibid, p. 8.
17 George Washington to Henry Lawrcns, 14 November 1778, in Writings, ed. J.C. Fitzpatrick, p. 256.
nation created by free men for free men, giving this infant nation a chance to grow,
strengthen, and mature. The Founding Fathers would do as all nations must: protect their
physical, political, and cultural identity against threats by other countries. Democracy,
however, demands consensus. The formulation and pursuit of the national interest would
have to be built upon a firm foundation o f public consensus. That consensus would not
be possible if the goals o f the leaders o f the government were not harmonized with the
political traditions of the people who were represented by that government. As succinctly
put by former Secretary o f State Henry Kissinger, “the acid test of a policy is its ability to
obtain domestic support. This has two aspects: the problem of legitimizing a policy
within the governmental apparatus ... and that of harmonizing it with the national 
18experience.” The key to harmonizing any policy, especially foreign policy decisions, 
within the context o f the American political tradition is to strike a balance between the 
pragmatic necessities o f national interest and the idealistic and moralistic impulses o f the 
American political culture. This will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent 
chapters.
One o f the most basic criticisms o f the idea o f national interest is that it is 
dangerously elastic and extremely elusive. There is no exact formula that prescribes what
18 As quoted in Gordon A Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft - Diplomatic Problems o f  
Our Time, 2nd Ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 213.
the national interest is in specific situations, or what actions would best serve that 
national interest. In practice, politicians quarrel endlessly over these very questions. The 
analogy used by Morgenthau that asks “what is the soldier is fighting for” is very 
illuminating in this regard. Individuals, as well as nations, will defend what is most 
precious to them; their lives, their homes, their families, and their beliefs and way o f life. 
A government, especially a representative one, should be expected to do no less for its 
citizenry. Morgenthau in his treatise, “Another Great Debate”, tries to break the concept 
o f national interest down into more manageable parts. “The content is determined by the 
political traditions and the total cultural context within which a nation formulates its 
foreign policy. The concept o f national interest, then has two elements, one that is 
logically required and in that sense necessary, and one that is variable and determined by 
circumstances.” 19 Morgenthau goes on to argue that in a world where nations compete 
with and oppose each other for power, the foreign policies o f all nations must necessarily 
refer to their survival as their minimum requirement. The Founding Fathers were keenly 
aware that their experiment called America did not have a large margin o f safety and its 
future was by no means a certainty. Both Hamilton and Jefferson understood the concept 
o f national interest in its rawest form - survival o f a dream called America. Washington 
alludes to the precarious nature o f the young republic in his first inaugural address: “The 
preservation o f the sacred fire o f liberty and the destiny of the republican form o f
19 Morgenthau, “Another Great Debate”, p. 972.
20
government are justly considered, perhaps, as deeply, as finally, staked on the experiment 
intrusted to the hands o f the American people.”
The survival o f the political unit, the nation, is the irreducible minimum, the
necessary element o f its interests vis-a-vis other nations. The determination o f the
necessary element o f national interest is relatively simple; for it encompasses the integrity
2 1o f the nation’s territory, o f its political institutions, and its culture . The situation is 
markedly different with respect to the variable elements of national interests, those that 
will vary over time and vary with circumstances. All the interplay o f personalities, public 
opinion, sectional interests, partisan politics, bureaucratic rivalries, pressure groups, and 
the media are brought to bear upon their determination. The increasing public awareness 
o f and involvement in foreign policy has, without question, complicated the task o f the 
management o f foreign affairs in today’s era o f instant information, the increase in 
information flow has led to much more public awareness and assertiveness in the conduct 
o f foreign affairs. Vietnam brought the realities o f war into the American living room. 
Cable television provided the American public with up-to-the-minute, 24-hour coverage 
o f the Persian Gulf War. The result of this near real-time coverage o f world events is a
20 Quoted in Schlesinger, p. 10.
21 I use the term culture to signify those often intangible social, intellectual, and artistic aspects o f  a nation 
that sets itself apart from other nations. In short, culture is a nation’s core beliefs and values. Schlesinnger 
talks about national character as those persisting traits, values, and folkways that create a national identity, 
(see Schlesinger, p. xii).
much more informed and vocal public. As with most decisionmaking, as the number of 
people involved increases, the more cumbersome the decision is to make. Tocqueville 
feared that the very nature of a democracy handicapped its ability to conduct foreign 
policy. “A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details o f an important 
undertaking, preserve in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite o f serious 
obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with
9 ?patience.” Tocqueville seems to view this aspect o f democracy as a weakness, I 
however, view it as a strength. A committed, supportive public can be an invaluable 
source o f national strength to sustain policies and endure hardship and sacrifice in pursuit 
o f the national interest. The true test of our nation’s leaders then is their ability to chose 
their battles wisely and illicit the support o f a nation’s most valuable resource - its 
people!
While the interests which a nation may pursue in its relations with other nations 
are o f an infinite variety and number, the resources available to pursue those interests are 
necessarily limited in quantity and kind. No nation has the resources to promote all 
desirable objectives with equal vigor; all nations must therefore allocate their scarce
22 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, ch. xiii. The question o f  whether Tocqueville opposed 
direct popular control o f  foreign affairs is unclear. I do not believe he meant to imply that democracies 
were inferior to other forms o f  government in terms o f conducting foreign policy, but rather points out the 
inherent difficulties a democracy will face when formulating and implementing its foreign policy.
resources as rationally and prudently as possible. The indispensable precondition o f such 
rational allocation is a clear understanding between the necessary and variable elements 
o f the national interest. Throughout the last century, America has had the luxury o f an 
almost unlimited power base which has been directly responsible for its victories in the 
two World Wars and the Cold War. However, the unexpected collapse o f the Soviet 
Union and the subsequent downsizing o f the U.S. military machine, the growing burden 
o f a huge budget deficit, and the substantial growth o f the economic power o f Japan, 
Western Europe, and the oil-rich nations in the Middle East have drastically altered the 
world’s power equation. With other nations challenging the preeminant position o f the 
United States, a more judicial assessment o f where, when, and how to involve itself is a 
harsh reality o f the evolving geopolitical situation. The blank check mentality is no 
longer valid. The Persian Gulf War and the necessity o f burden sharing, both militarily 
and economically, between the coalition forces is clear evidence o f this fundamental 
change in the world’s geopolitical, or as some authors prefer, geoeconomic landscape.
The question o f how morality fits into the equation o f national interest is a basic 
one and must be addressed if we are to develop a clear picture o f the American approach 
to foreign policy development. The most prevalent and persistent argument against the 
realists and their unflinching belief in the primacy of the national interest in the conduct 
o f international relations, is the misconception that basing foreign policy decisions purely
in terms o f the national interest contradicts the moral underpinnings o f the American 
political tradition. The essence of the idealist argument hinges on the premise that 
decisions based on the harsh, cold realities o f the geopolitical landscape are less 
desireable from a moral standpoint than those based on a more ideological or utopian 
foundation. Arthur Schlesinger highlights this basic schism between the realists and the 
idealists. “People who respond to international affairs divide temperamentally into two 
schools: those who first ask o f a policy, ‘Is it morally right?’, and those who first ask, 
‘Will it work?’; those who see policies as good or evil, and those who see them as wise 
or foolish. One cannot presume an ultimate metaphysical antagonism between the 
moralist and the realist. No realist can wholly escape perceptions of good and evil, and 
no policy can wholly divorce ethical from geopolitical realities.” Schlesinger is 
alluding to what I believe to be an essential truth in American foreign policy - the 
absolute necessity o f finding a proper balance between the lofty goals o f idealism and the 
harsh exigencies of realism.
Even the most adamant proponent o f national interest would agree with 
Schlesinger that the question of morality does have its place in foreign policy formulation 
and execution. Yet, the question remains o f how to determine right from wrong in the 
dealings between sovereign states. It is on this point where the two schools of thought
23 Schlesinger, pp. 96-97.
diverge. The idealist relies upon the moral code most familiar to him - the code that 
governs dealings among individuals. The idealist believes that the ethical considerations 
that constrain and guide behavior between individuals must also contrain and guide the 
behavior between states. Morgenthau persuasively argued against what he believed to be 
this fundamental flaw in the idealist approach to international relations by elaborating on 
the Hobbe’s dictum that the state creates morality as well as the law and that there is 
neither morality nor law outside the state24. According to Morgenthau: “Universal 
moral principles, such as justice or equality, are capable o f guiding political action only 
to the extent that they have been given concrete content and have been related to political 
situations by society. What justice means in the United States can within wide limits be 
objectively ascertained; for interests and convictions, experiences o f life, and 
institutionalized traditions have in large measure created a consensus concerning what 
justice means under the conditions of American society. No such consensus exists 
between nations.”25 Morgenthau is not debating the basic right o f man to defend 
himself, but stresses the necessity of a consensus o f the governed through the state in the
2,1 Morgenthau seems to be oversimplying the essence o f Hobbes’ Leviathan. Hobbes almost contradicts 
this notion o f  the state creating morality as well as law in Chapter 14 by stating “the Right o f  Nature, 
which writers commonly call Jus Nalurale, is the Liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will 
himselfe, for the preservation o f his own Nature; that is to say, his own Life; and consequently, o f  doing 
anything, which in his own Judgement and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereonto.” 
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, reprinted from the Edition o f 1651, ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), p. 99.
25 Morgenthau, In Defense o f  the National Interest, p. 34.
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determination o f morality and law. Morality and law become relevent only as men 
interact with each other in some organized fashion.
When we talk about the application o f moral standards to the formulation and 
conduct of foreign affairs, therefore, we are not talking about compliance with some clear 
and generally accepted international code o f behavior. If the policies o f the United States 
are to made to conform to moral standards, those standards are going to have to be 
America’s own, founded on American principles of what is right and what is wrong. 
When other nations fail to live up to these principles, and they have a significant and 
adverse effect on American interests, as distinct from our political tastes, it is within our 
right as a sovereign nation to take whatever action is necessary to protect and further our 
interests. What we cannot do is assume the moral standards we measure ourselves 
against are the same standards that must guide the actions o f others. Few o f us can lay 
claim to perfect knowledge or virtuousness, and as such are in no position to judge the 
morality o f the actions undertaken by other nations. The application o f “right” and 
“wrong” is at best arbitrary and relative. What is bad in the behavior o f our opponents is 
good, or at least acceptable, in the behavior of our friends. What is unobjectionable to us 
at one period in our history is offensive and unacceptable in another. George Kennan 
provides some prudent guidelines for American policy-makers in their pursuit o f the 
perfect policy. “This would be a policy founded on the recognition o f the national
26
interest, reasonabley conceived, as the legitimate motivation for a large portion o f the 
nation’s behavior, and be prepared to pursue that interest without either moral pretension 
or apology. It would be a policy that would seek the possibilities to morality primarily in 
our own behavior, not in our judgement o f others. It would restrict our undertakings to 
the limits established by our own traditions and resources. It would see virtue in our 
minding our own business wherever there is not some overwhelming reason for minding 
the business o f others.”26
The highest moral duty of the state must be the protection and perpetuation of its 
population, territory, institutions, and culture. Even though morality requires self- 
sacrifice on the part o f the individual, the state cannot be similarly bound. “The rule of 
morality,” Alexander Hamilton pointed out in the early days of the republic, “ ... is not 
precisely the same between nations as between individuals. The duty o f making its own 
welfare the guide o f its actions, is much stronger upon the former than upon the latter. 
Existing millions, and for the most part, future generations are concerned in the present 
measures o f government; while the consequences of private action o f an individual 
ordinarily terminate with himself, or are circumscribed with a narrow compass.”27 
Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian-scholar, also addressed this in Moral Man and Immoral
26 George F. Kennan, “Morality and Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.64, No. 2, (W inter 1985/86), pp. 
217-218.
21 Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus, No. 4, July 10, 1793.
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Society. According to Niebuhr, the obligation of the individual is love and sacrifice;
“from the viewpoint of the author o f an action unselfishness must remain the criterion of
the highest morality.” But states cannot be sacrificial. Governments are not individuals.
They are not principals but agents. They are trustees for the happiness and interests of
others. Niebuhr quoted Hugh Cecil’s argument that unselfishness “is inappropriate to the
28action o f the state. No one has the right to be selfish with other people’s interests.” In 
short, the state does not exist without its citizens. The highest good the state can do is to 
protect its people.
The question ultimately becomes; do you sacrifice the nation to pursue an
abstract moral principle? Abraham Lincoln confronted this issue when he considered
whether to make freeing the slaves the ultimate standard of his policy even at the risk of
destroying the Union, or whether to subordinate the more abstract principle o f universal
freedom to the most basic necessity o f the national interest - survival. Lincoln’s
unequivocal response is eloquently stated in a letter to Horace Greely. “If there be
those,” he wrote on August 22, 1862,
“who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save 
slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save 
the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not 
agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the 
Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the 
Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if could save it by
28 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, (New York, 1932), pp. xi, 258,267.
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freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some 
and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, 
and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and 
what I forebear, I forebear because 1 do not believe it would help to save 
the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts 
the cause, I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help 
the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall 
adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views.
I have here stated my purpose according to my view o f official 
duty; and I intend no modification o f my oft-expressed personal wish that
29all men everywhere could be free.”
As morally and personally compelling Lincoln felt freeing the slaves was, the issue of 
saving the nation was even more compelling, and what he felt was required o f him as a 
trustee o f the people he represented.
As quoted in Morgenthau, “Another Great Debate”, p. 982.
CHAPTER THREE 
HAMILTON AND JEFFERSON: THE TWIN PILLARS OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY
“The rivalry between these two remarkable figures became the focal point 
not only of the emerging party system at home but also o f two sharply 
different approaches to foreign policy. The conflict between them has 
echoed throughout American history.”
Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson
Many would argue that the answers to the challenges o f a dramatically altered 
political landscape of an increasingly complex world that is evolving in the aftermath of 
end o f the Cold War require a radical new approach to American foreign policy 
development. I could not disagree more. What is required to navigate through these 
turbulent times o f change and upheaval is a journey back to the beginnings o f the republic 
to reexamine and relearn the wisdom and genius of the small group o f enlightened men
30 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire o f  Liberty: The Statecraft o f  Thomas Jefferson , 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. ix.
29
30
we call our Founding Fathers. Hans J. Morgenthau’s prescription for the political 
challenges at the beginning o f the Cold War, ring true today as well:
“The United States offers the singular spectacle o f a commonwealth whose 
political wisdom has not grown slowly through the accumulation and 
articulation o f experiences. On the contrary, the full flowering o f its 
political wisdom was coeval with its birth as an independent nation; 
indeed, it owed its existence and survival as an independent nation to those 
extraordinary qualities o f political insight, historical perspective, and 
common sense which the first generation o f Americans applied to the 
affairs o f state”31
The birth of our fledgling republic and the building o f a new form of government 
were inextricably linked to the development o f a truly unique approach to foreign policy 
development. It is foolhardy, if  not impossible, to trace the development of how this new 
nation called America would deal with the outside world without having a basic 
understanding o f how the Founding Fathers approached the building of a new form of 
government. Both the basic structure of government and what would become the 
American approach to foreign policy were forged in the same crucible o f liberty, 
freedom, and uncertainty. Each contributed significantly to the evolution o f the other. 
Investigating the words and deeds of a small group o f men in the formative years o f the 
nation just after the Revolutionary War will provide a much clearer picture and deeper
31 I Ians J. Morgenthau, In Defense o f  the National Interest, p. 3.
understanding o f the basic precepts o f how the United States conducts its affairs o f state. 
Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson echo these same sentiments in, Empire o f  
Liberty: The Statecraft o f  Thomas Jefferson: “Animated by the thirst for fame...the 
Founding Fathers self-consciously spoke to the ages, even if they often cannot be heard 
through the harsh din o f modern life. In foreign policy, as elsewhere, their sayings still 
retain the capacity to illuminate the predicaments o f our times; and they have freshness 
and a power that will doubtless continue to make them a recurring source o f political
32wisdom and insight for future generations”
Who were these men, these visionaries who built a new nation? The monumental 
task o f building a new nation o f free men conceived in liberty and securing its place 
among other nations fell upon the shoulders o f a small group o f enlightened and 
dedicated men we have come to call the Founding Fathers. America’s unique response to 
the challenges and threats to the fledgling Republic was in large measure determined by 
the actions and attitudes of six men; George Washington, John Adams, John Jay, 
Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison. During the Confederation 
period, John Jay as secretary o f foreign affairs, John Adams as minister to England, and 
Thomas Jefferson as minister to France outlined the beginnings o f American foreign 
policy through the exchange of correspondence discussing the problems facing the new
32Tucker and Hendrickson, p. viii.
nation and suggesting solutions. All three were quick to realize the serious inadequacies 
o f the Articles o f Confederation in the conduct o f business between nations. They 
concluded that none of their plans could be implemented without a stronger and more 
unified central government. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison worked in 
Congress to secure greater national power by successfully convening the Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia. With the urging o f Hamilton, George Washington attended 
the Convention, lending his prestige and reputation to the efforts o f Hamilton and 
Madison to create a government capable o f pursuing a vigorous foreign policy. Hamilton 
and Madison, with the help of John Jay, authored the Federalist Papers, which were 
crucial in carrying the wisdom of the new Constitution to the people and helping secure 
its ratification.
Taking their places in the most important offices created by the Constitution of 
1789, this same group o f men were now able to act on the foreign policies they had only 
been able to discuss during the Confederation period. George Washington was elected 
the Republic’s first President, while John Adams became Vice President and presiding 
officer o f the Senate. Washington appointed Thomas Jefferson Secretary o f State and 
Alexander Hamilton Secretary o f the Treasury. James Madison was elected to the House 
o f Representatives and quickly established himself as its most influential member. John 
Jay became the Supreme Court’s first chief justice, and although not directly responsible
for foreign affairs, he was a close advisor to the president and ultimately negotiated the 
most important and contentious treaties o f the Washington administration. These were 
the decision-makers o f post-revolutionary America and architects o f the new nation’s 
foreign policy. An analysis of their ideas on foreign policy during these formative and 
defining years is absolutely essential if one is to truly comprehend the uniquely American 
approach to the conduct of affairs o f state.
O f this group o f men, two figures stand taller than the rest. Thomas Jefferson and 
Alexander Hamilton formed the twin pillars o f the emerging and evolving structure and 
content o f American foreign policy. The immediacy o f building a stronger, more perfect 
union and securing it s survival in a hostile world provided a clear impetus and focus for 
both Jefferson and Hamilton. Both these men were fervently dedicated to the same broad 
principles. They wanted to see a free, secure, and progressing America. They had given 
birth to a new nation, now they wanted to give it the opportunity to grow, mature, and 
Hourish. United by a common goal, but contentiously divided on how to achieve that 
goal, Jefferson and Hamilton bitterly debated which direction the new Republic’s foreign 
policy should take. Their primordial dispute and protean antagonism was fundamental 
and defining. As pointed out by Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson, “Differing 
systems o f political economy, rival conceptions o f the rights and duties imposed by 
nations and the ‘dictates o f national morality’, varying degrees o f the nature and necessity
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of military establishments - all these and more fueled the ferocious debate between these 
two men. The very purpose and meaning o f the nation were thrown into the contest,
1 1
which has never yielded a clear winner.” The vast expanse o f over two hundred years 
separates us from the sagacity and wisdom of these two great figures, but the legacy and 
legitimacy of their great debate persists to this day. Louis M. Hacker, in Alexander 
Hamilton and the American Tradition, highlights the essential truth o f the uniquely 
American approach to foreign affairs - the inescapable intermingling o f and inherent 
conflict between the rival philosophies o f Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. 
“We are all Jeffersonians, we are all Hamiltonians; yet so profound the impact has been 
of these two great men, the American today is either largely a Hamiltonian or he is 
largely a Jeffersonian.”34 The heated policy debates o f today are still framed in the 
context o f this inherent duality.
The central figure of early American diplomacy was, without question, Thomas 
Jefferson. In the post-revolutionary period, Jefferson held positions o f critical importance 
in these formative years of American foreign policy - as Minister to France from 1784 - 
1789, Secretary o f State under President Washington from 1790 - 1793, and finally, as 
President from 1801 - 1809. The United States, according to Jefferson, was progenitor of
n  Ibid., p. xi.
34 Louis M. Hacker, Alexander Hamilton and the American Tradition, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1957), 
p. 7.
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a new diplomacy, built on the consent and confidence of a free and virtuous populace, 
and would pursue goals based on the natural and universal rights o f man, using means 
other than war. Jefferson believed that our geographic separateness and political 
uniqueness had exempted America from the practices and precepts o f the old European 
traditions o f raison d ’etat and the balance o f power. The very notion that the security of 
the state and its aggrandizement should have precedence over domestic welfare, and that 
the actions o f the state ought to be judged according to a different moral standard than 
individuals, were ideas utterly antithetical to Jefferson’s more enlightened approach to 
human nature and the progress o f mankind.
Thomas Jefferson, the man, was an enigma, both puzzling and paradoxical - a 
Virginian nationalist, a slave-holding philosophe, an aristocratic democrat, a provincial 
cosmopolitan, and a pacific imperialist. Jefferson holds the key to unlocking the 
mysteries o f the American experience. Although scholars continue to argue to this day 
over the wisdom of his beliefs and his conduct of domestic and foreign affairs, their 
seems to be almost unanimous agreement that Thomas Jefferson was the predominant 
figure o f the early Republic. Henry Adams, the great American historian was very clear 
about the importance of this great man. “Almost every other American, might be
36
35described in a parenthesis.” According to Lawrence Kaplan, “No American statesman 
o f the revolutionary and early national periods made a more substantial contribution to 
the development of American foreign policy than Thomas Jefferson ... Jefferson’s 
idealism, tempered by a pragmatic regard for practical realities, played a key role in 
defining a distinctively American position toward the external world. No one ... ever 
blended the moralistic yearnings of the young republic for a new international order with 
the practical pursuit of national self-interest than he.”36 Merrill Peterson argued that 
Jefferson was the consummate pragmatic statesman, “actively seeking realizable goals
37within the limits of principle.” Gilbert Chinard was even more laudatory in describing 
the skills o f this great statesman. Chinard’s Jefferson, had “neither the pure and exalted 
morality o f the political philosopher”, nor the “cynical attitude o f the political boss.” He 
was not a “mere idealist, not simply a practical politician.” Rather he made “persistent 
efforts to propagate that gospel o f practical idealism that remains to this day one o f the 
fundamental tenets of Americanism.” This combination o f pragmatic and idealistic 
qualities was thought by Chinard to be the essence of the American character; in this light
38Jefferson stood as “the Apostle o f Americanism.”
35 Henry Adams, History o f  the United States During the Administration ofJefferson and Madison, (New 
York, 1903), Vol. I, P. 277.
36 Lawrence Kaplan, Entangling Alliances With None: American Foreign Policy in the age o f  Jefferson, 
(Kent, OH: Kent University Press), pp. 3 - 4 .
37 Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A Biography, (Oxford, 1970), p. 822.
38 Gilbert Chinard, Thomas Jefferson: The Apostle o f  Americanism, 2nd Ed., (Ann Arbor, MI, 1957), pp. 
275, 382.
Jefferson’s idealistic vision was to build an expansive “empire o f liberty”, but 
without the associated corruptions of an oppressive and intrusive government - a large 
military establishment and the burden of taxation to support it. The conflict between his 
ambitious foreign policy goals o f securing America’s borders, expanding its territory, and 
increasing its trade and the rejection of the tools needed to realize those goals went to the 
core o f the contradictions in Jefferson’s approach to foreign policy. Jefferson resolved 
this dilemma by pursuing a policy aimed at “conquering without war”, confident that the 
new Republic could achieve its goals by economic and peaceable means. In spite o f  these 
contradictions, Jefferson never abandoned the vision o f his empire of liberty. According 
to Lawrence S. Kaplan, “Jefferson never questioned what he wanted for America; he 
envisioned a society o f cultivated, independent men on terms o f equality with one 
another, keeping government as close to the local level as possible, living on farms rather 
than cities because the agrarian life best propagated the good life. Expansionism became 
part o f the plan because an American empire would remove the corrupt and dangerous 
mode o f Europe, as it would the pattern o f international commerce could also be 
reorganized to incorporate the American alternative to mercantilism, free trade. He 
identified urban commercial society with class conflict, with oligarchic manipulation of 
politics, and with European financial control over America, most especially Great 
Britain’s economic interests in its former colonies. To combat such dangers, he believed
38
that right reason applied to the right environment would create a society embodying the
• o n
best blend o f the Enlightenment with the frontier” . Where Hamilton looked to power 
and wealth to raise man above the worst aspects o f his nature, Jefferson looked to 
agriculture. Jefferson said that “those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of 
God ... whose breasts He has made this peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue 
... Corruption o f morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon o f which no age nor 
nation has furnished an example.”40
Free men, free trade was the encapsulation o f Jefferson’s approach to the 
formulation and conduct o f foreign policy. A disciple of the French philophes and 
physiocrats, Thomas Jefferson elevated free trade to an almost mystical level. Free trade 
would be the panacea to abolish the slavery o f mercantilism and the resultant wars and 
international rivalries. Even though Jefferson believed that free trade would lead to a 
more peaceful world, it gnawed at his picture o f a more virtuous, simpler, self-sufficient 
life on the farm. He thought it would have been better for peace and liberty to “practice 
neither commerce nor navigation, but stand with respect to Europe precisely on the 
footing o f China.”41 Jefferson feared that trade would corrupt the pureness o f America’s
v> Lawrence S. Kaplan, p. 7.
40 Jefferson, “Notes on Virginia”, in Andrew A. Lipscombe and albert E. Bergh, eas., Writings o f  Thomas 
Jefferson , (W ashington, D .C ., 1903-1904) Vol. II, p. 229. .Hereafter, Jefferson, Writings, (Memorial 
Edition).
41 Jefferson to G.K. van Hogendorp, October 13, 1785, in Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Papers o f  Thomas 
Jefferson, Vol. VIII, p. 633. Hereafter, Jefferson, Papers, (Boyd).
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new form o f government by leading to eventual avarice and greed. Too great an increase 
in trade, “will probably embark us again in the ocean of speculation, engage us to 
overtrade ourselves, ... divert us from Agriculture which is our wisest pursuit, because it 
will in the end contribute most to real wealth, good morals, and happiness. The wealth 
acquired by speculation and plunder is fugacious in its nature and fills society with the 
spirit o f gambling.”42
Jefferson’s lofty idealism was reigned in by the reality that trade, although 
dangerous, was a necessary evil if he wanted America to grow and strengthen. His dream 
of an empire o f liberty had to be reconciled with his belief in the simple virtues o f an 
agrarian lifestyle, as well as reconciled with the will o f the nation which was not as 
enlightened as Jefferson was. He could not ignore the will o f the people. He conceded 
that “our people arc decided in the opinion that it is necessary for us to share in the 
occupation o f the ocean.” Committed to the premise that it was the “duty o f those 
entrusted with the administration o f their affairs to conform themselves to the decided 
choice o f their constituents,” Jefferson decided it was in the national interest “to share as 
large a portion as we can of this modern source of wealth and power.”43 Still he hoped to 
appease his idealistic yearnings, with the desire to keep trade relegated as a “handmaiden
42 Jefferson to Washington, August 14, 1787, ibid., Vol. XII, p. 38.
42 Jefferson to John Jay, August 23, 1785, ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 426. Jefferson to Washington, March 15,
1784, ibid., Vol. VII, p. 26.
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of agriculture”, carrying off America’s agricultural surplus and bringing back only those 
vital manufactured goods that the United States could not produce indigenously.
Thomas Jefferson’s anti-British feelings are well documented and appear to have 
been a source o f influence over his foreign policy decisions. The destruction o f the South 
and his own estate by the English during the War for Independence were certainly 
instrumental in his underlying dislike and distrust o f the British. Jefferson came to 
believe that the British were the only people on earth who wished America ill from the 
bottom of their souls and considered England a natural enemy o f the United States.44 
Jefferson’s loathing for the British was offset by his deep fondness for the French. His 
warm feelings can easily be seen in a letter written to Abigail Adams. “I would not give 
the polite people o f this country and their amiability in every point o f view ... for ten such 
races of rich, proud, hectoring, swearing, squibbling, carnivorous animals [as the 
British].”45 It is crucial to note, however, that Jefferson’s oft-stated preference for the 
French did not cloud his judgment when pursuing the interests o f the nation. He wrote 
John Adams in 1784, “Our interest calls for a perfect equality in our conduct towards 
[England and France]; but no preferences.”46
44 Jefferson to William Carmichael, December 17, 1787, ibid., Vol. XII, p. 424.
45 Jefferson to Abigail Adams, June 21, 1785, ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 239.
46 Jefferson to John Adams, September 24, 1784, ibid., p. 545.
When given a choice, Jefferson would invariably lean towards France because he 
truly believed that France was “the only nation on whom we can solidly rely for 
assistance till we can stand on our own legs.” He would not go as far as to stake the 
survival o f the country by officially tying America to France. He believed that “no 
circumstances o f morality, honor, interest, or engagement are sufficient to authorize a 
secure reliance on any nation, at all times and in all positions.”47 Jefferson understood 
that the nation’s survival required playing off one great power against the other. The 
primacy o f American independence was a constant in Jefferson’s thinking. He preferred 
an agriculturally based society o f free land holders to an industrial society founded on 
commerce and trade, but realized the future of his vision o f an empire of liberty was 
inexorably tied to the expansion o f trade and commerce, and the stronger central 
government needed to secure those ends. Jefferson subordinated foreign to domestic 
policy believing that the domestic system as he envisioned it would provide the essentials 
of happiness and well-being; liberty, justice, and domestic tranquillity. Foreign policy 
was merely to be a handmaiden to these ends, defending the system from outside 
encroachment and influence, supplying the minimum amount o f foreign trade as a market 
for America’s agricultural surplus, and gaining territory for the expansion o f the 
American empire.
47 Jefferson to John Jay, November 3, 1787, ibid., Vol. XII, p. 310.
Thomas Jefferson was caught in an almost constant struggle between his idealistic 
vision o f America and the hard, cold truths o f a pragmatic world. What remained 
consistent throughout his distinguished career was his unflinching belief in the justice o f 
his policies; they were moral by virtue o f their American character. For all his 
contradictions, he never separated national interest from morality in the formulation and 
conduct o f foreign affairs. Hans J. Morgenthau described Jefferson as a leader who 
conceptualized his foreign policy in terms of moral principles and lofty idealism, but 
acted as all nations must, on the basis of national interest. This contradictory essence o f 
Thomas Jefferson is the very embodiment of the inherent duality o f the American 
approach to international relations. Just as Jefferson struggled to find a balance between 
the impulses pulling him in different directions, so we must struggle to search for a 
balance between the idealism o f the American soul and the realities o f the external world.
Jefferson’s unique approach did not evolve immediately. Only in the course of 
bitter and emotionally-charged confrontations with Alexander Hamilton did Jefferson’s 
novel diplomatic outlook fully evolve. Hamilton would play the supporting role, but a 
role that was just as fundamental and defining as that o f Jefferson. Both Hamilton and 
Jefferson made significant contributions to the American political tradition, but far more 
important and lasting was the synergism created by their energetic and inspired 
interaction. What each brought to the table was formidable, but what the nation walked
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away with was almost priceless. Their dynamic and differing philosophies and talents 
superbly complimented and balanced each other, checking the excesses o f the other’s 
more extreme views, resulting in the nation reaping the benefit o f the best that both men 
had to offer. Louis M. Hacker highlighted this essential truth of American politics. “If 
Thomas Jefferson - with his deep and abiding confidence in the intelligence, integrity, 
and humanity o f man - unerringly guided America to a democratic commitment, 
Alexander Hamilton as surely and as permanently laid the basis for its success. Alexander 
Hamilton, in political and economic terms, built the American nation; Thomas Jefferson, 
in democratic and humanist terms, gave it its unique dedication.”
One of the more contentious topics of debate concerning Alexander Hamilton has
been the supposition that he pursued his vision o f America for personalized
aggrandizement and advancing the goals o f the moneyed and privileged class. One
histographer, Joseph Charles advanced this theory in Hamilton and Washington: The
Origins o f  the American Party System. According to Charles:
“Hamilton put his trust in the privileged classes and considered their 
interests as inseparable from those o f society as a whole. He wanted a 
close collaboration between this country and England. He aimed at the 
closest possible union, even a high degree o f consolidation, between the 
different parts o f this country, and he wanted a powerful central 
government. These aims were so closely related in the conditions o f time 
that they are perhaps aspects of the same plan, an he probably thought of 
them as different means toward a single goal. The economic program
Louis M. Hacker, p. 22.
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which he advanced furthered these aims in every respect. It made for the 
supremacy of the propertied classes; it involved as much consolidation 
and as great a centralization of power as would have been accepted at that 
time; and it brought in its train intimate commercial and diplomatic 
relations with Great Britain.”49
A cursory examination o f the actions o f Hamilton might lead to these conclusion, but
Charles’ interpretation o f the true motivations behind these actions is somewhat naive
and biased. Transplanted to our time, this could very well be the interpretation of a
liberal Democrat of the fiscal policies o f a conservative Republican.
There should be no question, that Alexander Hamilton was as dedicated to 
survival and prosperity o f the new republic as Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton’s 
philosophies and beliefs, although markedly different from those o f Jefferson, are ever bit 
as relevant. As with most things, truth lies somewhere in between the two extremes. 
Hamilton firmly believed that for a nation to grow and prosper, it must have a vibrant 
industrial base, a stable financial system, and have a clear legal basis for the 
adjudication o f claims. Hamilton, as distinct from the more “enlightened” views of 
Jefferson, read the meaning of the capital processes both realistically and imaginatively: 
Adam Smith was his teacher, and as the student, Hamilton understood that the wealth o f a 
nation and its welfare went hand-in-hand. According to this conservative philosophy, a
w  Joseph Charles, “Hamilton and Washington: The Origins o f the American Party System”, William and  
M ary Quarterly, 3d Ser., Vol. XII, No. 2, (1955), p. 245.
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polity will not survive unless justice, equality of opportunity, and therefore the chance to 
rise are always assured. Industrialization, and its concurrent diversification o f the 
economy, provides the dynamic environment necessary for the realization o f well-being 
and creates the opportunity for class mobility.
Some of the more damning commentaries on Hamilton suggest that his only goal 
was to establish the English mercantilist system on this side of the Atlantic. Russell Kirk, 
in his work, The Conservative Mind, believed that Hamilton was a Tory in patriot’s 
clothing seeking to establish a mercantilist America, equating welfare, through strong 
governmental action with the encouragement and enrichment of “particular classes and 
occupations.”50 According to the theory o f mercantilism, wealth flowed from a nation’s 
foreign trade and a favorable balance o f payments. The crucial factor was the necessity 
o f keeping the costs o f production low, making manufactured goods competitive in 
foreign markets. It followed that the wealth of a nation, therefore, was in its labor force 
engaged in the production of goods and services for export, and the size, docility, and 
poverty o f its labor force made possible the creation o f wealth for the whole body politic. 
The larger, the more subservient, and the poorer a country’s laborers, the wealthier and 
stronger that nation would be. It was from these oppressive and stifling conditions that 
Europeans iled to America. Hamilton believed that in a country o f free men,
50 Russel Kirk, The Conservative Mind, (Chicago, 1953), pp. 69-70.
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industrialization would lead to the creation of wealth not only for the privileged few, but 
also for the workers. Wealth would provide freedom to move not only geographically, 
but socially as well. Hamilton also aggressively pursued American industrialization in 
order to make our nation less dependent on the manufactures o f other countries.
Equality of opportunity, in Hamilton’s mind, meant little if not backed by equality 
in political institutions, and equality before the law. He strongly believed that the 
transmission o f English law was one o f America’s greatest assets. The rule o f law and a 
constitutionally established form o f government were always utmost in the mind of 
Hamilton. For him, the greatest guarantors of freedom and liberty were republican 
institutions based on the representative principle and the separation of powers, and the 
safeguarding o f the rights o f the individual through exact, codified procedures51. 
Understanding Hamilton in this context, it is not hard to understand his alarm at the 
usurpation o f power by the farmers in the Shays’s Rebellion. Hamilton must put down 
the Whiskey Rebellion because it threatens the authority o f the constituted government, 
jeopardizing the very foundations of the new republic. Hamilton opposed the French
511 must point out that Hamilton appears to have been very concerened about the economic rights and 
responsibilities o f individuals by continually stressing the importance o f  codified procedures in economic 
and financial transactions. In te re s tin g , Hamilton did not support the addition o f  a bill o f rights to the 
Constitution. (See Federalist 84)
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Revolution on this same premise - the instability and chaos o f every phase o f the 
revolution from Jacobinism to Bonapartism threatens liberty rather than advances it.
Hamilton’s belief in the importance of a strong central government is rooted in his 
underlying philosophy o f the nature of man. Hamilton was schooled in the older 
Christian tradition believing man inherited and transmitted Original Sin, and, as such, 
was capable o f good and evil. According to this traditional view o f human nature, 
government was necessary to prevent man - as well as groups of men - from preying on 
others. Men, as creatures o f passion were ruled by their immediate interests rather than a 
higher self-imposed morality. Hamilton, in almost a mocking response to the beliefs of 
Jefferson, wrote at the conclusion o f the sixth Federalist, “It is now time to wake up from 
the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of 
our political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants o f the globe, are yet remote 
from the happy empire o f perfect wisdom and perfect virtue.” The essential nature of 
man necessitated a strong national government. “Great power, commerce, and riches,” 
Hamilton wrote in 1782, “may ... be denominated evils; for they lead to insolence, and 
inordinate ambition, a vicious luxury, licentiousness o f morals, and all those vices which 
corrupt government, enslave the people, and precipitate the ruin o f a nation.” It was the
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role o f government, therefore, “to guard against the encroachments upon the rights o f the 
community.”52
It is from this battlefield o f competing philosophies and ideas o f two great men 
that two main tributaries o f thought ebbed and flowed, competing for dominance of the 
early American political psyche; one empirically based, the other more dogmatic; one 
viewing affairs o f state from the perspective o f history, the other from the perspective of 
ideology; one supposing that the United States shares the imperfections, weaknesses, and 
evils incident to all societies, the other regarding the United States as a beacon of 
democracy given special charge to spread the light of liberty to th other nations of the 
world. It is within this context that we will examine the specific external threats faced by 
the new republic and the basic foreign policies advocated by Thomas Jefferson and 
Alexander Hamilton.
52 Alexander Hamilton, Works, ed. H.C. Lodge, 12 vols., (New York, 1904), Vol. Ill, p. 361.
CHAPTER FOUR
FINDING A BALANCE: TH E DUALITY O F AM ERICAN FOR EIG N  POLICY
DECISIONM AKING
“We should remain dedicated to the ideals o f freedom and justice that have 
served as beacons of our foreign policy, but be realistic and practical about 
what it takes to move the world in their direction.”
President Richard M. Nixon
“No realist can wholly escape perceptions o f good and evil and no policy 
can wholly divorce ethical from geopolitical considerations.”54
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
Now that the political and philosophical underpinnings o f the twin pillars of 
American foreign policy, Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, have been 
examined, it is necessary to put them into a historical context by examining their struggle 
as they hammered out America’s foreign policy in the political storms of the early years
53 Richard M. Nixon, p. 278.
54 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., p.70.
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of the republic. The challenges facing these political adventurers were immense and 
foreboding. They were called upon to create a Union of free men that would be lasting, 
but not oppressive; to conceive, build, and implement a program of fiscal integrity that 
would furnish essential public revenues and encourage private capital investment by 
Americans and foreigners; and, to protect the hard-fought sovereignty from the ravages 
o f wars that raged around them. Jefferson and Hamilton met these challenges with 
courage, wisdom, and determination, but bitterly debated one another over the courses to 
be pursued to meet the obstacles that laid before them. Their accomplishment was 
mighty, for they not only created a Union, they built a nation. As impressive as this 
accomplishment was, it is dwarfed by the more important and enduring contribution they 
made to the new republic; a firm foundation upon which America would build its truly 
unique approach to foreign affairs. The inherent duality o f the struggle between idealism 
and interest is the lasting legacy Jefferson and Hamilton gave to the American political 
tradition.
In the course of investigating the beginnings and the evolution o f this great debate 
over the role o f idealism and national interest in American foreign affairs, three periods of 
time emerge, each with a distinct historical and geopolitical backdrop which provided the 
fuel and the framework for the continuation and development o f the great debate begun 
by Jefferson and Hamilton. The peculiar circumstances and challenges o f each period
resulted in different responses to the question of what role America should play in world 
politics. The three periods were the emergence o f a new nation - the post-revolutionary 
years through the War o f 1812; the conquering of a continent - the realization of 
America’s manifest destiny between 1814 and Spanish-American War; and, the 
reemergence o f America as a world power beginning with the Presidency o f Theodore 
Roosevelt. Although relevant and enlightening, it would be beyond the scope o f this 
paper to examine each o f these periods in detail. My purpose will be to focus in on the 
debate as it raged between its two progenitors in the turbulent and tenuous years leading 
up to the War of 1812.
Jefferson, as well as Madison believed that trade held the key to peace between 
nations. Both thought trade would create a commonality o f interest that would deter 
nations from waging war out o f fear o f losing valuable goods and income. They also 
believed that commercial retaliation could serve their vision o f peace and security. Their 
whole policy towards England was based on that predisposition and they were convinced 
that commercial retaliation would forcibly remind England that its long term interests 
were best served by a conciliatory and cooperative posture towards the United States 
aimed at fostering the commonality of interest mutual trade provided. Retaliatory 
measures, Jefferson’s weapon o f choice, would enable America to challenge Great Britain 
without the necessity of an army, a navy, domestic manufactures, extensive revenues, or a
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strong, centralized government. This view of Jefferson and Madison was founded partly 
on wishful thinking and their assessment of the power situation between the two 
countries. It was Jefferson’s fervent desire to achieve his diplomatic goals by avoiding 
the logic o f the ancien regime and the more traditional tools o f power. Predominant in 
Jefferson’s motivation was to preserve his vision o f republicanism for the new nation. 
Jefferson concurrently believed that the United States was in a position strong enough to 
force concessions from the English.
Hamilton and his followers in Congress feared that retaliatory measures would 
surely bring on a ruinous commercial war with England, inflicting more damage on 
ourselves than on our enemy. The nation’s entire credit structure, the key to Plamilton’s 
plan for a strong and powerful America, rested on the revenue derived from the tariff and 
tonnage duties charged on imports, with ninety percent of all American imports coming 
from Britain. The United States received over six million dollars annually from 1791 to 
1796 from this one source of revenue. The amount generated from domestic sources only 
rose above six hundred thousand dollars once during that same period.55 Since the 
annual interest alone on America’s debts amounted to over two million dollars and the 
cost o f running the government was more than six hundred thousand dollars, the infusion
55 Adam Seybert, Statistical Annals, (Philadelphia, 1818), p. 750, as quoted in Jerald A. Combs, The Jay 
Treaty; Political Battleground o f  the Founding Fathers, (Berkeley, CA: University o f  California Press, 
1970), p. 40.
o f these trade-generated fund was absolutely essential56. A commercial war with 
England, shutting off trade would be disastrous. As Hamilton wrote Jefferson, “My 
commercial system turns very much on giving a free course to trade, and cultivating good 
humor with all the world. And I feel a particular reluctance to hazard any thing, in the 
present state of our affairs, which may lead to a commercial warfare with any power.”57 
Hamilton was also concerned that America was not yet self-sufficient, and depended on 
British trade to supply manufactures needed for internal stability and national defense. 
His solution to the dilemma was to avoid challenging England until the United States had 
developed its own industrial base to a point where the nation would have the goods and 
revenue required to see the nation through an emergency.
Madison and Jefferson disagreed with Hamilton’s assessment. Madison told 
Congress in 1789, “ ... we are now in a condition to wage commercial warfare with that 
country [England]. The produce o f this country is more necessary to the rest o f the world 
than that o f other countries was to America.” He was afraid America would suffer in a 
contest because England’s “interests can be wounded almost mortally, while ours are
58invulnerable.” Hamilton strongly opposed what he believed to be a serious
56 Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century, 2 vols., (Boston, 1903), 
Vol. I, p.74, as quoted in Combs, The Jay Treaty, p. 40.
57 Hamilton to Jefferson, January 13, 1791, Hamilton, Works, (Lodge), Vol. IV p. 348.
58 Annals o f  Congress, Vol. I. pp. 205, 237.
overestimation o f American strength and a dangerous underestimation o f the importance 
of British trade to the economic well-being o f the nation. He argued the United States 
could not do without British manufactures the Americans had come to rely on, and the 
crucial revenue from duties on British trade. Jefferson and Madison were convinced the 
United States was almost totally self-sufficient in the three essentials o f life - food, 
clothing, and shelter. They naively believed that British products were merely luxuries 
that the noble and virtuous farmer would gladly do without. As good agrarians, Jefferson 
and Madison surmised that the only benefit o f trade with England, especially the British 
West Indies, was to supply a market for America’s agricultural surpluses. According to 
their theory, as it went with the farmer, so it went with the nation.
Hamilton, who regarded nations and individuals as instinctively selfish and 
interest driven, was not surprised nor offended by British policies. In his opinion, these 
policies were the result of Britain pursuing its interests, but incorrectly calculating what 
actions and policies with the United States would best serve those interests. Hamilton did 
not believe the English would bite off their nose to spite their face, and that their dealings 
with the United States were not motivated by anger or hatred. If England could be 
convinced that its true interests lay in conciliating rather than opposing the United States, 
it would change its policy. Retaliation, would force a hostile reaction and response; and 
then reason and interest would give way to passion. Hamilton argued that the new
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republic had limited policy options because it was ill-equipped for confrontation; it 
lacked even the most basic elements o f national power - an army, a navy, an indigenous 
industrial base, and an extensive and invulnerable source of revenue.
Had Jefferson accepted the premises o f Hamilton’s argument, he would have been 
faced with a difficult choice; appease Britain or build a power base capable o f 
confrontation. But, making America strong would endanger those things that Jefferson 
held so dear; domestic happiness, liberty, justice, and tranquillity. Jefferson sidestepped 
and avoided confronting the dilemma by judging America had the weapon necessary to 
exert significant influence without threatening its domestic system o f government. That 
weapon was trade.
Hamilton did not succumb to the idealistic vision that trade was the cure for war 
and that commerce between nations would breed peaceful relations because others would 
hesitate to fight the United States for fear o f losing valuable trade. For Hamilton, trade 
was only part o f the power equation that would make the young nation strong. Fearing 
that commercial confrontation with England would eventually lead to armed conflict that 
America was not prepared to fight, he advocated great moderation to avoid war with 
Great Britain. Hamilton believed the best way to preserve peace was to be prepared for 
war. In The Federalist he sounds a warning for his countrymen, “Let us recollect, that
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peace or war, will not always be left to our option; that however moderate or 
unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the 
ambition o f others ... To judge from the history o f mankind, we shall be compelled to 
conclude, that the fiery and destructive passions o f war, reign in the human breast, with 
much more powerful sway, than the mild and beneficent sentiments o f peace; and, that to 
model our political systems upon the speculations of lasting tranquillity, is to calculate on 
the weaker springs o f the human character.”59
A strong navy and a standing army were key elements of Hamilton’s plan for a 
powerful and secure nation. The major purpose o f a navy, as Hamilton saw it was to 
protect America’s trade. Without an offensive navy, “our commerce would be prey to the 
wanton untermeddlings o f all nations at war with each other; Who having nothing to fear 
from us, would with little scruple of remorse supply their wants by depredations on our 
property, as often as it fell their way. The rights o f neutrality will only be respected, 
when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, 
forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.”60 Even more contentious was Hamilton’s 
desire for a regular army. Jefferson, as well as most Americans, feared a standing army 
as a serious threat to internal liberty. Hamilton regarded it as a necessity for the defense
59 Federalist No. 34, Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist, (Middletown, Conn., 1961), p. 212.
f'° Federalist No. 11, ibid., pp. 68-69.
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the nation: “The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army, can 
only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind.”61
Hamilton’s ideas were put to the test in the Nookta Sound crisis o f 1790 between 
Spain and the United States. This incident erupted when England challenged Spain’s 
claim to unilateral control o f the Pacific Ocean, threatening war between America’s two 
closest neighbors. The war offered both an opportunity and a danger to the United States. 
The belligerents might be willing to make concessions in trade, borders, posts, or 
navigation o f the Mississippi to keep America from joining or assisting the other side. 
Both Spain and England had things America needed to secure its tenuous position in the 
New World. On the other hand, the United States could find itself in the middle of 
hostilities. Great Britain might demand the right to cross American soil to attack Spanish 
colonies. If America refused, it might bring war with England; if she acceded, it might 
bring war with Spain. Hamilton wanted war with neither, but was determined to avoid 
war with England, who he felt was by far the more serious threat. When Washington 
asked his cabinet for advice, Hamilton argued that the United States should agree to allow 
the British to march across the territory because the new nation had no power to enforce a 
negative response. “The consequence ... of refusal, if not effectual, must be absolute
61 Federalist No. 25, ibid., p. 162.
disgrace or immediate war.”62 Hamilton did not want to force a confrontation with 
England and risk fighting a war on the weaker side. Hamilton’s answer was not in 
balancing superior power, but rather in joining it. In advising Washington to give British 
forces passage, he was acting on the assumption that if America failed to acquiesce, Great 
Britain would simply seize Louisiana and the Floridas on her own. Such a situation 
would be intolerable for the Americans because it would dangerously increase England’s 
presence and influence on the western frontier and damage commercial relations between 
the two nations. Hamilton warned that, “by rendering New Orleans the emporium of 
products o f the Western country, Britain would, at a period not very distant, have little 
occasion for supplies or provisions for their Islands from the Atlantic States; and for their 
European Market they would derive from the same source copious supplies o f Tobacco 
and other articles now furnished by the Southern States; Whence a great diminution of 
the motives to establish liberal terms o f commercial Intercourse with the United States 
collectively.”63 Anglophilia played little part in the decision; fear, not friendship 
motivated Hamilton. Hamilton’s policy was never put to the test because England never 
requested passage across the American frontier, but it clearly showed that he 
conceptualized foreign policy in the context o f what he believed would further the 
nation’s interests. Jefferson accepted Hamilton’s assessment of the situation, but felt that
62 Hamilton, Works, (Lodge), Vol. IV, p. 329.
63 Hamilton to Washington, September 15, 1790, in Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, eds., The Papers 
o f  Alexander Hamilton, 26 vols., (Washington, D.C., 1961-1979), Vol. 7, pp. 46-47.
by tipping our hand to the English lessened our chances o f extracting concessions from 
England for permission to use our territory to wage war on the Spanish. His preferred 
policy was to maintain American neutrality, allowing American ships to carry the goods 
of both belligerents, and providing incentives to both England and Spain to modify their 
positions on the Mississippi and the western posts. Jefferson believed the interests o f the 
republic would be better served if  we pressured England rather ally with her. He 
instructed Gouveneur Morris to relay to the British that America would remain neutral if 
Britain would “execute the treaty fairly and attempt no conquests adjoining us.”64 This 
brief period o f relative consensus between these two antagonists was the calm before the 
storm.
In the spring of 1793, Washington received letters from Jefferson and Hamilton 
informing him o f the fact that France had declared war on almost every other nation in 
Europe. Washington knew that a war in Europe would stir the passions o f the American 
public and could prove divisive. Hoping that the general desire for peace would override 
the sympathies for England and France, he decided on a policy o f strict neutrality. 
Washington, as well as Jefferson and Hamilton, did not want to embroil the young 
republic in a conflict that was being fought on distant shores and for reasons of little
64 Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris, August 12, 1790, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Writings o f  Thomas 
Jefferson , 10 vols., (New York, 1892-1899) Vol. V, p. 225. Hereafter, Jefferson, Writings, (Ford).
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concern for America. Washington, heeding the counsel o f his young lieutenant, 
Hamilton, issued what came to be known as his Proclamation o f Neutrality, formally 
declaring that the United States would not participate in the war on behalf o f either 
belligerent. The heated debate between Jefferson and Hamilton over exactly how and 
why America would remain neutral brought into sharper focus the emerging duality in 
American foreign policy.
America was caught in a dilemma: France was at war; and France had claims on 
America, sentimental ties, claims of gratitude for aid during our struggle for 
independence, and the bonds o f two treaties. Two treaties were entered into with France 
in 1778. One was a treaty of alliance; which guaranteed the territorial integrity o f both 
countries “forever against all powers.” The other was a treaty of amity and commerce, 
which permitted France and the United States to use each other’s ports for anchorage of 
warships and for privateers and their bounty. Compounding the problem for the 
Administration, was the fact that America also had a treaty o f peace with Great Britain. 
Washington hoped to solve this dilemma by declaring strict neutrality on the part o f the 
United States.
It was in the course of defending Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality, which 
was issued on April 22, 1793, that Alexander Hamilton laid out in detail and eloquent
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fashion the concept o f national interest as the driving force behind America’s foreign 
policy. Between June 29 and July 20, 1793, he wrote seven newspaper essays, under the 
pen name o f “Paci ficus”, in which he addressed the questions being so bitterly debated as 
a result o f Washington’s proclamation. Among the arguments against the proclamation 
were three derived from primarily moral and idealistic considerations: faithfulness to 
treaty obligations; gratitude toward a country who had lent its assistance to our fight for 
freedom; and, the affinity of republican forms of government. Hamilton unashamedly 
addressed these three principles invoking the national interest o f the United States as his 
rule and his guide.
“There would be no proportion between the mischiefs and perils to 
which the United States would expose themselves, by embarking in the 
war, and the benefit which the nature o f their stipulation aims at securing 
to France, or that which it would be in their power actually to render her 
by becoming a party.
This disproportion would be a valid reason for not executing the 
guaranty. All contracts are to receive a reasonable construction. Self- 
preservation is the first duty o f a nation; and though in the performances of 
stipulations relating to war, good faith requires that its ordinary hazards 
should be fairly met, because they are directly contemplated by such 
stipulations, yet it does not require that extraordinary and extreme hazards 
should be run ...
The basis of gratitude is a benefit received or intended which there 
was no right to claim, originating in a regard to the interest or advantage of 
the party on whom the benefit is, or is meant to be conferred. If a service 
is rendered from views relative to the immediate interest o f the party who 
performs it, and is productive of reciprocal advantages, there seems 
scarcely, in such a case, to be an adequate basis for a sentiment like that of
gratitude ... It may be affirmed as a general principle, that the predominant 
motive o f good offices from one nation to another, is the interest or 
advantage of the nation which performs them.
Indeed, the rule o f morality in this respect is not precisely the same 
between nations as between individuals. The duty of making it owns 
welfare the guide o f its actions, is much stronger upon the former than on 
the latter; in proportion to the greater magnitude and importance of 
national compared with individual happiness, and to the greater
permanency o f the effects o f national than individual conduct. Existing
millions, and for the most part future generations, are concerned in the
present measures o f a government; while the consequences o f the private 
actions o f an individual ordinarily terminate with himself, or are
circumscribed within a narrow compass.
Whence it follows that an individual may, on numerous occasions, 
meritoriously indulge the emotions o f generosity and benevolence, not 
only without an eye to, but even at the expense of, his own interest. But a 
government can rarely, if at all, be justifiable in pursuing a similar course; 
and if it does so, ought to confine itself within much stricter bounds ... 
Good offices which are indifferent to the interest o f a nation performing 
them, or which are compensated by the existence or expectation o f some 
reasonable equivalent, or which produce an essential good to the nation to 
which they are rendered, without real detriment to the affairs o f the 
benefactors, prescribe perhaps the limits o f national generosity or 
benevolence...
But we are sometimes told, by way o f the answer, that the cause of 
France is the cause o f liberty; and that we are bound to assist the nation on 
the score o f their being engaged in the defense o f that cause ...
The obligation to assist the cause of liberty must be deduced from 
the merits o f that cause and from the interest we have in its support. ”65
65 Hamilton, as quoted in Hans J. Morgentliau, In Defense o f  the National Interest, p. 16-18.
Make no mistake, Jefferson was as strong an advocate for American neutrality as 
was Hamilton. When writing to the President to inform him that the war had actually 
broke out, Jefferson emphasized that it was “necessary in my opinion that we take every 
justifiable measure for preserving our neutrality.”66 However, Jefferson’s conception of 
neutrality differed markedly from that of Hamilton. Jefferson leaned towards a neutrality 
favoring France, while Hamilton envisioned a neutrality favoring Britain. Jefferson felt 
strongly that Washington should withhold any announcement o f neutrality until England 
and France had an opportunity to bid for it. He thought that the United States should ask 
“the broadest privileges o f neutral nations.”67 It was on this basis that Jefferson opposed 
the issuance o f Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality; he felt he could barter for a 
better deal. Hamilton felt the young nation did not have the necessary bargaining 
position to extract the concession Jefferson thought he could get from England, and, more 
importantly, Hamilton feared the devastating effects a war with England would have on 
America. As well as outlining the role of national interest in his “Pacificus” articles, 
Hamilton, also warns of the dangers o f a war with Great Britain. “With the possessions 
o f Great Britain and Spain on both fianks[Spain being allied with Britain at this time], the 
numerous Indian tribes under the influence and direction o f these powers, along our 
whole interior, with an extended seacoast, with no maritime force o f our own, and with
66 Jefferson to Washington, April 7, 1793, Jefferson, Writings, (Ford), Vol. VI, p. 212.
67 Jefferson to Madison, June 23, 1793, Madison Papers, Library o f Congress
the maritime force o f all Europe against us, with no fortifications whatever, and with a 
population not exceeding four millions...,” war with England would bring the destruction 
o f American trade “and the most calamitous inconveniences in other respects.”68 While 
Hamilton saw the possibility o f grave danger for America in the war between England 
and France, Jefferson saw a unique opportunity. Jefferson thought that England, already 
in a life-and-death struggle with France, would be reluctant to provoke any additional 
enemies, and would therefore be willing to make concessions to the United States to keep 
her out o f the contest. The issuance o f the Proclamation o f Neutrality was only the 
beginning of the turmoil, the United States would have to now defend its rights of 
neutrality from the wrath o f the belligerents.
In December 1793, the British negotiated a truce between Portugal and the 
Algerian pirates which allowed the pirates to harass and plunder ships conducting trade in 
the Atlantic. American would ultimately bear the brunt o f this truce, because it was the 
only nation with a large Atlantic trade that did not have any treaty with the Algerians, and 
American ships would be likely and frequent targets of the pirates. The Portuguese- 
Algerian truce was the first in a series of diplomatic maneuvers that brought England and 
the United States to the brink o f war. America was now becoming increasingly 
concerned not over whether to remain neutral, but rather, how to remain neutral and
fllt “Pacificus III”, Hamilton, Works, (Lodge), IV, pp. 458,456.
protect its assets and interests. Addressing Congress in December 1793 following the 
news o f the Algerian truce, Washington, with the advice and concurrence o f Hamilton, 
stressed, “I cannot recommend to your notice measures for the fulfillment o f our duties to 
the rest o f the world, without again pressing upon you the necessity o f placing ourselves 
in a condition o f compleat defence, and or exacting from them the fulfillment o f their 
duties towards us. If  we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to 
secure peace, one o f the most powerful instruments o f our rising prosperity, it must be 
known, that we are at all times ready for War.”69 While the President spoke o f preparing 
for war as a means o f defending our neutrality, his Secretary o f State was approaching the 
problem from another angle. Jefferson, in line with his early pronouncements, advocated 
the use o f commercial retaliation. Addressing Congress, he stated that although free trade 
should be our guiding principle; “ ... should any nation, contrary to our wishes, suppose it 
better find its advantage by continuing its system o f prohibitions, duties, and regulations, 
it behooves us to protect our citizens, their commerce and navigation, by counter 
prohibitions, duties, and regulations also. Free commerce and navigation are not to be 
given in exchange for restrictions and vexations; nor are they likely to produce a
70 •relaxation o f them.” In a last-ditch effort to avoid what seemed to an unavoidable 
armed conflict with England, Washington sent John Jay to London in early 1794 to begin
w Fifth Annual Address to Congress, December 3, 1793, Washington, Writings, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 165- 
169.
70 Jefferson’s Report on Commerce, Jefferson, Writings, (Ford), Vol. VI, pp. 472 - 483.
66
the negotiations that would eventually result in the Jay Treaty, one o f the most bitterly 
contested treaties in the history o f the United States.
According to Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendickson, the conclusion and the 
ratification o f the Jay Treaty o f 1794 and the Pinckney Treaty of 1795, securing 
America’s effective title to the eastern Mississippi valley, was the zenith o f Federalist 
statecraft. Washington, and the Federalists, had made peace with both England and 
Spain. From Britain Jay secured the evacuation o f the Northwest posts and obtained 
rights to trade with the British colonies of the East and West Indies; from Spain Pinckney 
obtained recognition o f the 31st Parallel as the boundary between the United States and 
Spanish Florida, the navigation o f the Mississippi, and the right of deposit in New 
Orleans. The Pinckney Treaty achieved most of its stated objectives and was viewed as a 
success by both the Federalists and the Republicans. The Jay Treaty, however, was the 
source o f bitter debate and great conjecture. The Federalists contend that it was the best 
bargain that could have been obtained; it secured the western territories o f the growing 
nation and kept America out o f a war it was so ill prepared to fight. But these 
concessions were bought at a heavy price, and the treaty would be severely criticized 
despite its success in keeping the peace until 1812.
The main source of disagreement was over the apparent inequities in the terms of 
trade between America and England. The Republicans felt that the United States was in a 
strong enough position to demand much more than was obtained by Jay. In fact, 
Jefferson denounced the treaty in particularly harsh terms. To him, it was a “monument 
o f folly and venality,” an “infamous act, which is nothing more than a treaty o f alliance 
between England and the Anglomen o f this country against the legislature and people of 
the United States”71 The Republicans knew that England had no great desire to start a 
war with America, given their tenuous position in Europe. What Jefferson and the 
Republicans failed to fully appreciate was that Britain was even less inclined to give up 
their maritime advantages. Hamilton argued, as he had previously, that commercial 
retaliation against England would force a military confrontation, leaving America with 
two unacceptable choices; either fight a stronger enemy, or concede in disgrace. The 
debate raged in the halls of Congress as well as in the streets of the nation. In the end, the 
Federalists emerged victorious. By securing peace, the Jay Treaty bought valuable time 
for the country to grow stronger and less susceptible to the wishes o f a distant Europe. 
For the Federalists this meant no less than the survival of the nation. As bad as the treaty 
was, it preserved the peace, and as Washington wrote, “Twenty years peace with such 
increase o f population and resources as we have a right to expect; added to our remote 
situation from the jarring power, will in all probability enable us in a just cause, to bid
71 Jefferson to Rutledge, November 30, 1795, Jefferson, Writings, (Memorial Edition), Vol. IX, p. 314.
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72defiance to any power on earth.” For the Republicans, the prognosis was markedly 
different. They felt that America was already strong enough to confront any foe, and 
peace did not have to be bought at the price of humiliation.
Thus, while the Jay Treaty preserved a precarious peace between England and the 
United States, it fueled the already heated political debate between Thomas Jefferson and 
the Republicans, and Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists. The quarrel between these 
two figureheads o f American political tradition over America’s proper goals and the 
extent o f power necessary to implement them developed into the two enduring and 
defining impulses o f the American political mindset. The conflict had developed out of 
differing concepts o f the nature, the necessary extent, and the use of American power in 
foreign affairs. The Jay Treaty was a watershed signaling the decline o f the Federalists 
and their influence, and the ascendancy of Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans. The 
drama o f the Jay Treaty was replayed from 1805 to 1812, this time with the Republican 
principles emerging victorious. The Republicans would wield their sword of commercial 
retaliation with the Embargo o f 1807, resulting not in British concessions, but ending in a 
war the Federalists had always feared and predicted.
72 Washington to Charles Carroll, May I, 1796, Washington, Writings, Vol. XXXV, pp. 30 - 31.
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As the eighteenth century drew to a close, the political power structure made a 
dramatic shift away from the Federalists and their more traditional and historical73 
approach to foreign affairs, toward the more enlightened approach o f Thomas Jefferson 
and the Republicans. The new century ushered in by a new president and a new party 
was still in a state o f turmoil and upheaval, and the dangers for the Republic were both 
real and immediate.
The outlook Jefferson brought to the Presidency in 1801 had also made a dramatic 
shift. The constant struggle with Hamilton and the Federalists had turned him into a 
radical opponent o f a strong, and according to Jefferson, intrusive central government. 
Armies, navies, and diplomatic establishments which he had previously accepted as 
necessary to the survival of the new nation, were now envisioned as grave threats to the 
republican experiment at home. Even his commitment to spreading the republican ideal 
abroad had cooled dramatically. The Convention o f Mortfontaine, dissolving the 
American alliance with France was fully consistent with Jefferson’s new thinking, which 
called for “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations - entangling alliances 
with none.”74 Napoleon Bonaparte’s rise to power and the termination of America’s 
alliance with France fed Jefferson’s notion o f American exceptionalism. As he entered
731 use the term historical in the sense o f viewing America primarily as one among many, rather than 
totally distinct and exempt from the forces that have shaped the interactions o f  nations in the past.
7,1 First Inaugural, March 4, 1801, Jefferson, Writings, (Memorial Edition),Vol. Ill, p. 321.
the Presidency, Jefferson was blessed to govern “a rising nation, spread out over a wide 
and fruitful land, traversing all the seas with the rich productions o f their industry, 
engaged in commerce with nations who feel power and forget right, advancing to 
destinies beyond the mortal eye.” Freed from the shackles of Federalism, Jefferson 
believed the republican experiment, to which he was religiously committed, was about to 
firmly take root. He wrote; “A just and solid republican government maintained here, 
will be a standing monument & example for the aim & imitation of the people o f other 
countries; and I join with you in the hope and belief that they will see, from our example, 
that a free government is o f all others the most energetic; that the inquiry which has been 
excited among the mass o f mankind by our revolution & its consequences, will
75ameliorate the condition o f man over a great portion o f the globe.” America would 
indeed be the beacon o f democracy for the rest of the world.
It is somewhat ironic that Jefferson would build his empire of liberty on a premise 
which he felt the young nation could exempt and immune from; that concept being the 
balance-of-power. His enlightened vision would be built on the very foundation of the 
system he sought to escape - the ancien regime. Jefferson’s America would play the role 
o f jackal, living off the spoils it could steal from more powerful predators praying on 
each other. And being the jackal, America would not always be able to escape the wrath
75 Jefferson to John Dickinson, March 6, 1801, Jeffeson, Writings, (Ford), Vol. VIII, pp. 7-8.
of the more powerful adversaries. Jefferson looked at the turmoil in Europe as a 
tremendous advantage and opportunity for the young nation. “Tremendous times in 
Europe! How mighty this battle o f lions and tigers! With what sensations should the 
common herd o f cattle look on it? With no partialities certainly. If they can so far worry 
one another as to destroy their powers of tyrannizing, the one over the earth, the other the 
waters, the world may perhaps enjoy peace ...” He expected not only to avoid 
entanglements, but also hoped the Republic would “fatten on the follies o f the old 
[nations] by winning new territory and new concessions from their wars.”76
As President, and as advisor to his successor, James Madison, Jefferson would 
chip America’s niche out of the emerging balance-of-power. For Jefferson, the balance- 
of-power in Europe would produce an equilibrium achieved through the distribution of 
economic and military strength between the major powers of Europe where no one nation 
would be strong enough to destroy the others or menace the security o f a non-belligerent 
like the United States. He hoped the resultant deadlock in Europe would free America to 
expand her territory at the expense of the preoccupied nations o f the Old World.
Jefferson built his foreign policy on the pragmatic reality o f the balance-of-power in
Europe to advance his idealistic visions o f liberty and republicanism in America. This 
was the very essence o f Jefferson’s strategy to conquer without war.
76 As quoted in Lawrence S. Kaplan, pp. 112-113.
The unexpected acquisition o f Louisiana would be the crown jewel o f the 
statecraft o f Thomas Jefferson. Almost half a continent was obtained by peaceable means 
and at a negligible price. This triumph o f truth and reason over the power o f the sword, 
would seem to affirm the Republican’s assessment of the balance-of-power and their 
strategy to conquer without war. But, in reality, the Louisiana Purchase was one of the 
most fortuitous windfalls in the history o f the United States. Jefferson based everything 
on the premise o f peace for America, and the promise o f war for England and France. He 
hoped to barter America’s neutrality for concessions from the belligerents. The most 
pressing issue o f national interest facing Jefferson was to secure the control o f the 
Mississippi River, the major avenue for westward expansion. The control o f the 
Mississippi valley by the Spanish was o f little concern for the Jefferson administration; 
Spanish rule in Louisiana was steadily declining in effectiveness and the Spanish posed 
little threat to the security o f the United States. It would be France who would provoke 
the crisis with the signing of the Treaty of San Ildefonso on October 1, 1800 by which 
Spain would conditionally retrocede Louisiana to France. And it would be France who 
would end the crisis when Napoleon, beset by difficulties in Haiti, startled American 
negotiators in Paris, by offering to sell the whole of Louisiana to the United States. 
Control o f the western borders and access to the Mississippi by either France or England 
was unthinkable to Republicans and Federalists alike. In early 1803, Hamilton urged the 
administration to pursue a more vigorous policy to meet the threat o f French control of
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Louisiana. As he saw it only two courses of action were available: “First, to negotiate 
and endeavor to purchase, and if this fails to go to war. Secondly, to seize at once on the 
Floridas and New Orleans and then negotiate.” Hamilton, being far more hawkish in his 
outlook, favored the “shoot first-then negotiate” option, and to this end urged immediate 
increases in the army and navy.77 Consistent with his more pacific philosophy and the 
desire to avoid threatening his vision of republicanism, Jefferson decided to negotiate and 
try to play his trump card o f a possible alliance with Great Britain against France. In his 
famous letter to the newly appointed Minister to France, Jefferson clearly laid out his 
strategy to deal with the crisis over Louisiana. “Although our natural friend,” he wrote, 
in possessing New Orleans, France must become “our natural and habitual enemy.” By 
doing so, he warned, France would seal its own fate, for in taking New Orleans it would 
not only force America into an alliance with Great Britain but require the United States 
“to turn all our attention to a maritime force, for which our resources place us on very 
high grounds.” When war broke out again in Europe, the United States would seize the 
opportunity to tear up any settlement France had made, and would then hold “the two 
continents of America in sequestration for the common purpose of the united British and 
American nations.” In such a contest of arms, France would immediately lose New 
Orleans. “For however great her force is than ours compared in the abstract, it is nothing
77 "Pericles”, New York Evening Post, February 8, 1803, Harold C. Syrett, ed., The Papers o f  Alexander 
Hamilton , (New York, 1961-79), Vol. XXVI, pp. 82-85.
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78in comparison o f ours when to be exerted on our own soil.” This letter is considered 
the fullest and most complete expression Jefferson gave to his diplomatic strategy in 
regards to the Louisiana crisis.
It has not been ascertained if the letter every reached the French government, but 
nonetheless it did lay out the essentials of Jefferson’s diplomatic approach to the crisis - a 
threat of alliance with Great Britain against France. The President did not want an 
alliance with England, but rather he only wanted to use the threat o f an alliance as a lever 
to force France into a favorable settlement. Robert W. Tucker and David C. 
Hendrickson illuminate the dilemma that Jefferson placed himself in the middle of: “He 
wished in particular to avoid both war with France and alliance with England. He was 
loathe to accept either prospect not because he failed to appreciate the interests that were 
at stake but because he was persuaded that either course of action would mean the 
sacrifice o f his vision o f domestic society. The one would threaten the corruption o f the 
Republican experiment, which depended so heavily on avoiding the debt and taxes that 
war would bring; the other would compromise America’s status o f independence.”79 
Jefferson played a dangerous game by talking strongly, while carrying a small stick! 
Time and circumstance proved to be on the side of Jefferson: war between France and
78 Jefferson to Livingston, April 18, 1802, Jefferson, Writings, (Ford), Vol. IX, pp. 363-369. 
7J Tucker and Hendrickson, Empire o f  Liberty, p. 125.
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England re-ignited and the unforeseen setback o f the French forces against the slaves in 
Santa Domingo forced Napoleon to reevaluate his whole position on French designs on 
the American continent. Jefferson’s strategy of conquering without war had won a major 
battle, but the victory would prove to be short-lived.
As the war in Europe progressed, the question of neutral rights would again be put
to the diplomatic test. The dispute with England centered on two points of contentions;
impressment o f American sailors, and growing restrictions on American trade. Jefferson
sent two envoys, James Monroe and William Pinckney, to England to negotiate a treaty
addressing these two contentious issues. Secretary o f State Madison issued very clear
instructions to the two envoys. An acceptable treaty would have to include a pledge by
the English to refrain from all impressments on the high seas; and, at least restore the
80favorable conditions of trade laid out in the 1800 Polly rule . These two stipulations 
were sine qua non for Jefferson; without them the nonimportation bill would go into 
effect. Jefferson would again unsheathe his weapon o f choice, trade. The British, 
assessing the Americans would be hurt more by retaliatory trade measures, called 
Jefferson’s bluff and summarily rejected the treaty as proposed by Monroe and Pinckney. 
Madison, overestimating the power situation of the United States, warned that if an
80 The Polly decision o f 1800 conferred immunity on the carrying trade in colonial goods so long as 
neutral vessels broke their voyage by stopping in a neutral port, unloading their cargo, and paying import 
duties.
76
agreeable treaty was not made America had the power to deliver a fatal and crippling
blow to Great Britain. “The necessities of life and o f cultivation, can be furnished to [the
British West Indies] from no other source than the United States,” he said, “immediate
ruin would ensue if this source were shut up.” The United States might cut off the supply
o f naval stores and grain, on which Britain would likely become increasingly dependent.
Britain could retaliate with no commercial injury worth mentioning, and a resort to war
81would be a losing proposition. Great Britain was unmoved by such verbal threats and 
the Embargo of 1807 took effect. The end result would be the war o f 1812.
Ironically, Jefferson’s consummate belief that America could completely exempt 
itself from the harsh realities o f the age old game o f statecraft and protect his idealistic 
vision o f the republican experiment from the dangers o f conflict would ultimately result 
in exactly what he had hoped to avoid, war. Hamilton, who believed the best way to 
protect and preserve the fledging republic against the predatory lusts of other nations was 
to prepare itself for war, would be the one who kept his country out of war. Even as both 
these men faded from the political landscape their ideas and debate was indelibly etched 
onto the American political psyche.
81 Madison to Monroe and Pinckney, May 20, 1807, Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings o f  James Madison, 
Vol. VII, pp. 444-445.
After the War o f 1812, the United States, having secured a foothold on the new 
continent, withdrew' into the cocoon o f Manifest Destiny to settle a country and build a 
nation. The words o f Jefferson and Hamilton were muffled by the din o f expansionism. 
The new nation’s respite from the rigors and dangers of world affairs were relatively 
short-lived. As the 19th century came to a close, two factors would combine to 
irrevocably thrust the United States onto the world scene and to the forefront of 
international politics; America’s rapidly expanding power, and, the deterioration of the 
international system centered on Europe. The great debate began by Jefferson and 
Hamilton was surfacing again, but with new disciples and a significantly altered political 
landscape. Theodore Roosevelt spoke in the more realist tones o f Alexander Hamilton, 
while Woodrow Wilson emerged as the champion o f Jeffersonian idealism.
Roosevelt, well versed in the politics o f the Old World, was a sophisticated 
analyst o f the balance o f power. He staunchly advocated an international role for the 
United States because its national interest demanded it. Wilson also saw a leadership role 
for America, but, for Wilson, the justification o f America’s international role was 
messianic: America’s mission was not to throw its weight in to balance the crumbling 
powers of Europe, but to spread its idealistic and democratic principles throughout the 
world. The essence o f Wilsonianism is that peace, the perpetual peace as envisaged by 
Kant, would be built upon the foundation of democracy, that nation-states should be held
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to the same moral standards as individuals, and the national interest consisted o f adhering 
to a universal system o f law and collective security. Wilson’s vision for America was 
one o f internationalism and intervention, whereas Jefferson’s vision for America was one 
of idealism and isolation. It is absolutely essential to understand that Woodrow Wilson 
and Thomas Jefferson were not cast from the same political or idealistic mold. Jefferson, 
although idealistic in tone, never lost touch with the national interest o f the young 
Republic. Wilson, on the other hand, could never conceptualize American foreign policy 
other than in idealistic terms. There was no difference between what motivated his 
actions and the actions themselves. Even the stalwart realist, Hans J. Morgenthau, 
highlighted the fundamental difference between Jefferson’s and Wilson’s brand of 
idealism.
“The illusion that a nation can escape, if it wants to, from power
politics into a realm where action is guided by moral principles rather than
by considerations of power is deeply rooted in the American mind. Yet it
took more than a century for that illusion to crowd out the older notion
that international politics is an unending struggle for power in which the
interests o f individual nations must necessarily be defined in terms of
power. Out o f the struggle between these two opposing conceptions, three
types o f American foreign policy have emerged: the realistic - thinking
and acting in terms o f power - represented by Alexander Hamilton; the
ideological - thinking in terms of moral principles, but acting in terms of
power - represented by Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams; and,
the moralistic - thinking and acting in terms of moral principles -
82represented by Woodrow Wilson.”
82 Morgenthau, pp. 13-14.
The influence o f Wilson should not be underestimated. Henry Kissinger goes as 
far to state: “ ...It is above all to the drumbeat o f Wilsonian idealism that American 
foreign policy has marched since his watershed presidency, and continues to march 
today.”83 The call by John F. Kennedy for his country to “bear any burden and pay any 
price” clearly shows that Wilson’s brand o f idealism has perseverved.
83 Kissinger, p. 30.
CHAPTER FIVE 
VIETNAM: IDEALISM OVER INTEREST
“Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay 
any price bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose 
any foe to assure the survival and the success o f liberty.”84
President John F Kennedy 
“Perhaps the most serious, and surely the most hurtful, domino which fellOf
as a result o f the Vietnam War was the cohesion o f American society.”
Henry Kissinger
On January 23, 1973, when U.S. Secretary o f State William Rogers signed the 
Paris peace agreements, the United States “won” the Vietnam War. According to 
President Nixon, the United States had achieved its goal o f “peace with honor”, but I find 
this assessment o f victory by the former President to be overly self-congratulatory and 
dangerously self-deluding. What the signing o f the Paris peace accords really indicated
84 John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961, in Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United 
States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 Vol., (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 72.
85 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 699.
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was the United States had finally formally extricated itself from a conflict that it had no
business involving itself in. After ten years of direct military involvement, with a human
toll o f 50,000 American lives, and at a cost of over $50 billion, the Vietnam war can
hardly be assessed in any terms other than a tragic defeat. Never before had America
paid such a heavy price for so little gained. The Vietnam experience tore at the American
soul and plunged the country into a period of self-doubt and political paralysis. President
Nixon, surprisingly, provides a fitting epitaph for this regrettable period in American
foreign policy. “The Vietnam War has grotesquely distorted the debate over American
foreign policy. The willingness to use power to defend national interests is the
foundation o f any effective foreign policy, but our ineptness in Vietnam led many
Americans to question the wisdom of using our power at all.”86 I strongly agree with Mr.
Nixon’s assessment o f the importance o f basing foreign policy decisions on a thorough
and proper determination o f what constitutes the national interest, and then reconciling
*
the ever-present ideological tendencies of the American political psyche with the harsh 
realities o f world politics and international relations. Had Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson properly harmonized the Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian impulses, the United 
States would not have decided to involve itself in what became a tragedy in American 
foreign policy.
1,6 Richard M. Nixon, No More Vietnam.?, (New York: Avon Books, 1985), p. 13.
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How could Kennedy and Johnson, and to a smaller degree, Truman and
Eisenhower, have made such a serious miscalculation? George Ball, one o f the few
advisors who argued from the outset against direct military involvement in Vietnam
provides what, in my opinion, is the most incisive and accurate post mortems on the
decision to “assist” the South Vietnamese in their struggle against the Communist
onslaught from the North. Ball, somewhat sarcastically, addresses some o f the more
fashionable explanations of why the United involved itself in Vietnam.
“We enmeshed ourselves in Vietnam, so they tell us, because our ‘foreign 
policy establishment’ - whatever that banal term may mean - was co-opted 
from too narrow a stratum o f American society to reflect the wisdom of 
the people, or - according to others - because the ‘military and industrial 
complex’ - that all-purpose bogeyman - gained the upper hand, or because 
the State Department was far too obsessed with Europe to understand 
Asia, or finally - so the Marxists solemnly assert - because the war was 
inevitably dictated by capitalism’s contradictions. Such pseudo­
explanations should not be taken seriously; they are roughly at the 
intellectual level of the student who confidently assured me on a campus 
some years ago, ‘everyone knows why we are in Vietnam; it is because
87we want their tin.”
Ball uncovers what is, in my opinion, the essential truth of why both President Kennedy 
and President Johnson bogged the country down in the quagmire o f the Vietnam conflict. 
“Proceeding down quite discreet paths marked out by their individual logic and expertise, 
two Presidents and substantially the same group of advisors converged by unhappy 
destiny on a common conclusion: That a South Vietnamese defeat would endanger vital
117 George W. Dali, Diplomacy fo r  a Crowded World, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), p. 47.
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United States’ interests, and that we must intervene to prevent it. I contended at the time
- and events have confirmed that contention - that involved a misappraisal o f the
*. . •  «88 situation.
Four American presidents and their administrations let idealistic and moralistic 
concerns unduly influence their assessment of the strategic importance o f Vietnam to the 
United States. Each of the four ignored the warning o f their nineteenth century 
predecessor, John Quincy Adams who had cautioned his countrymen against venturing 
abroad in pursuit o f “distant monsters.” Communism was indeed a monster in need of 
slaying, just as Germany had been in the two world wars, but the Wilsonian approach to 
foreign policy allowed no distinction to be made among the monsters to be slain. The 
colors o f the Cold War world were black and white. Wilsonian idealism was incapable of 
distinction and differentiation, unable and unwilling to analyze the relative importance of 
various countries and regions o f the world. America was duty bound to fight for what 
was right, regardless o f local circumstances and the price to be paid. A more pragmatic 
approach geared to an analysis of America’s national interest would have differentiated 
between what was o f vital importance and what was peripheral. It would have brought to
88 Ibid., p. 47. Excellent accounts o f George Ball’s role o f devil’s advocate in the policy debate over 
Vietnam can be found in: Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President, (New York: Random Mouse, 1991); 
and David L. Dileo, George Ball, Vietnam, and  the Rethinking o f  Containment, (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University o f  North Carolina Press, 1991)
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light the logic o f why an obscure, embattled Asian country was significantly more 
important to the security o f the United States than the sleeping giant o f China.
Each o f the four Presidents baptized in the fire o f the Cold War, elevated the role 
o f the redeemer nation from a beacon o f democracy to a crusading angel o f liberty. 
Truman, in his inaugural address, committed his country to the objective o f a world in 
which “all nations and all peoples are free to govern themselves as they see fit.” The 
United States would “strengthen freedom-loving nations against the dangers of 
aggression” by providing “military advice and equipment to free nations which will
• 89 •cooperate with us in the maintenance of peace and security.” Eisenhower continued to 
build upon this theme o f tying the freedom of every single independent nation to the 
national interest o f the United States, regardless of their geopolitical significance. 
“Conceiving the defense o f freedom, like freedom itself, to be one and indivisible, we 
hold all continents and peoples in equal regard and honor. We reject any insinuation that 
one race or another, one people or another, is in any sense inferior or expendable.”90 
Collective security, rather than national security, was becoming the dominant force of 
American foreign policy. Kennedy’s inaugural would become the very embodiment of
89 Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949, in Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States: Harry S. 
Truman, 1949 Vol. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 112-114.
90 Inaugural Address, January 20, 1953, in Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States: Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, 1953 Vol., (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 7.
American altruism. His soaring language stirred the souls o f an idealistic generation and 
pledged not to “permit the slow undoing o f those human rights to which this nation has 
always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the 
world. Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any 
price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure 
the survival and success o f liberty.”91 President Johnson could not escape the ideological 
shackles forged by his political predecessors, and could do no less than to commit his 
country to protect the fires o f freedom around the globe. “Terrific dangers and troubles 
that we once called ‘foreign’ now constantly live among us. If American lives must end, 
and American treasure was to be spilled, in countries that we barely know, then that is the
09price that change has demanded o f convictions and o f our enduring covenant.” An 
ideological altar was being built that many American lives would soon be sacrificed 
upon.
The monolithic threat of Communism was the devil incarnate and it was 
America’s dogmatic duty to fight it wherever and whenever it reared its ugly head. 
Geopolitical analysis o f the specific dangers posed by the communist conquest o f an
91 Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961, in Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States: John F. 
Kennedy, 1961 Vol., (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 1.
92 Inaugural Address, January 20, 1965, in Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f  the United States: Lyndon B. 
Johnson, 1965 Vol., (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 72.
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unknown country in Indochina was usurped by the more ideologically palatable goals of 
resisting aggression in the abstract and preventing the spread o f communism at all costs.
The most fundamental error made was to the character o f the conflict itself. For 
many, the conflict in Vietnam equated roughly to the Korean War. Yet, unlike Korea, the 
struggle in Vietnam was not a classical invasion by one country into another. The 
geopolitical realities o f Vietnam were far more complex. Even though the Viet Cong 
were supplied and supported, and to a considerable extent, directed from Ho Chi Minh 
and the Communists in North Vietnam, their was indigenous support for overthrowing 
the government o f South Vietnam. By labeling the Viet Cong as mere agents o f Hanoi, 
the inner circle o f policy advisors reinforced their diagnosis o f external aggression, 
thereby legitimizing their basis for involvement. Too much rationalizing and not enough 
serious diagnosis was taking place. The fact that the struggle did have the makings o f a 
civil war was discounted because of the fact it still wore a Communist face, and a victory 
in Vietnam would mean a victory for the Communist hegemony. Given our policy 
makers idealistic predisposition to bear any burden, pay any price to defeat the evil 
empire o f communism, it was not hard to justify making a stand at the 17th Parallel. 
From Truman on, geopolitical analysis of the specific dangers posed by the conquest o f a 
distant country, in this case Vietnam, was deemed subordinate to the twin policy goals of 
resisting aggression in the abstract and preventing the further spread o f communism. The
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fall o f China to Mao and the communists cemented the conviction o f American leaders 
and policy makers that no further communist expansion could be tolerated.
Policy documents and official statements clearly show that this conviction went 
largely unchallenged. Just prior to the start o f the Korean conflict, National Security 
Council (NSC) document 64 stated that Indochina was “a key area o f South East Asia and
93is under immediate threat.” NSC 64 outlined what was to become known as the 
Domino Theory, which postulated that if  Indochina fell to the communists, Burma, and 
Thailand would follow, and that “the balance o f Southeast Asia would then be in grave 
hazard.”94 A month later, in April 1950, NSC document 68 concluded that nothing less 
than the global equilibrium was at stake in Indochina: “...any substantial further extension 
o f the area under the domination o f the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no 
coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled.”95 
In 1952, a National Security Council document formalized the emerging Domino Theory 
and gave it a more menacing face. It argued that the loss o f even a single Southeast 
Asian country would lead “to relatively swift submission to or alignment with 
communism by the remainder. Furthermore, an alignment with communism o f the rest of
M Quoted in Jeffrey P. Kimball, ed., To Reason Why: The Debate About the Causes o f  U.S. Involvement in 
the Vietnam War, (New York: MacGraw-Hill, 1901), p. 73.
94 Ibid., p. 73.
95 NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”, April 7, 1950, in U.S. 
Department o f State, Foreign Relations o f  the United States, 1950, Vol. 1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977), p 237-238.
Southeast Asia and India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East (with the possible 
exceptions o f at least Pakistan and Turkey) would in all probability progressively 
follow.”96 The crucial fact that eluded most of the policy debate from the 1950s onward, 
was that Vietnam, and Southeast Asia as a whole was o f little strategic value to the 
United States. The communist threat was being perceived as monolithic in nature and 
being controlled by the Kremlin. Analysts, making a gross error in logic, considered a 
loss o f  Indochina to communism would be o f the same strategic importance o f a loss of 
Europe to the communists. Idealistic blinders were preventing the serious geopolitical 
evaluation o f the importance o f Vietnam to the interests o f the United States.
The Pentagon Papers published by the New York Times in June and July 1971, 
are an invaluable source o f information describing the decision making behind America’s 
involvement in the Vietnam conflict. The record shows that President Kennedy made his 
decisions on Vietnam following the strong advice of his Vice President, Lyndon Johnson, 
who visited Vietnam in May, 1961. The Vice President summed up his findings as 
follows. “The fundamental decision required of the United States - and time is o f the 
greatest importance - is whether we are to attempt to meet the challenge o f Communist
95 “ United States Objectives and Courses o f  Action with Respect to Southeast Asia,” Statement o f Policy
by the National Security Council, 1952, in Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, W.W. Kenworthy, Fox 
Butterfield, The Pentagon Papers, as Published by the New York Times, (New York: Quadrangle Books, 
1971), p. 28.
expansion now in Southeast Asia by a major effort in support o f the forces o f freedom in 
the area or throw in the towel.” He goes on to point out the possible costs involved in 
such a commitment. “This decision must be made in full realization of the very heavy 
and continuing costs involved in terms of money, o f effort, and o f United States prestige. 
It must be made with the knowledge that at some point we may be faced with the further 
decision o f whether we commit major United States forces to the area or we cut our 
losses and withdraw should our efforts fail.” Johnson concludes his report by calling 
attention to the broader implications of this critical decision. “What we do in Southeast 
Asia should be part o f a rational program to meet the threat we face in the region as a 
whole. It should include a clear-cut pattern o f specific contributions to be expected by 
each partner according to his ability and resources. I recommend we proceed with a
97clear-cut and strong program of action.”
In October 1961, two other key advisors traveled to South Vietnam to further 
assess the security situation and report back to President Kennedy. General Maxwell 
Taylor, special advisor to the President on military affairs, and Walt Rostow, Chairman 
o f the State Department Policy Planning Council. The recommendations by Taylor and 
Rostow played a key role in President Kennedy’s decision to continue and expand 
America’s involvement in Southeast Asia. General Taylor concluded that the outcome ol
97 “Report by Vice President Johnson on His Visit to Asian Countries”, Pentagon Papers, p. 130.
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the struggle in Vietnam depended largely on what the United States decided to do, or not 
to do, and he strongly recommended to the President that the United States make a “broad 
commitment to a joint effort with Diem” to mobilize the resources o f both the United 
States and South Vietnam to win the struggle against the Communists, including the
• 98introduction o f American combat forces into South Vietnam. Taylor did warn o f the 
risks involved:
a. The strategic reserve of U.S. forces is presently so weak that we can ill 
afford any detachment of forces to a peripheral area of the Communist 
bloc where they will be pinned down for uncertain duration.
b. Although U.S. prestige is already engaged in SVN, it will become more 
so by sending troops.
c. If the first contingent is not enough to accomplish the necessary results, 
it will be difficult to resist the pressure to reinforce. If the ultimate result 
is the closing of the frontiers and clean-up o f the insurgents within SVN, 
there is no limit to our possible commitment (unless we attack the source 
in Hanoi).
d. The introduction of U.S. forces may increase tensions and risk 
escalation into a major war in Asia, (my emphasis)
Taylor concluded with the assertion that the introduction o f a “military task force without 
delay offers definitely more advantages than it creates risk and difficulties. I do not 
believe our program to SVN will succeed without it.”99
98 “Taylor Summary o f  Findings on Mis Mission to South Vietnam”, Pentagon Papers, p. 144.
99 “Cable from Taylor to Kennedy on Introduction o f U.S. Troops”, Pentagon Papers, pp. 141-142.
The report o f the Taylor mission set into high gear the policy-making apparatus of 
the Kennedy administration, culminating in a National Security Council meeting in 
November 1961. Two key questions were raised: how important is Vietnam to the 
national interest of the United States in Southeast Asia, and in Asia as a whole; and, what 
price is the United States willing to pay to prevent a Communist takeover in South 
Vietnam? Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reported that he, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and Deputy Secretary o f Defense Roswell Gilpatric were in agreement. “The fall 
o f South Vietnam to Communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension o f Communist 
control, or complete accommodation to Communism, in the rest o f mainland Southeast 
Asia and Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly in the Orient 
would be extremely serious.” McNamara echoed the same warnings that General Taylor 
had previously provided. “The chances against, probably sharply against, preventing that 
fall by any measures short o f the introduction o f U.S. forces on a substantial scale ... we 
would almost be certain to get mired down in an inconclusive struggle.”
Secretary o f State Dean Rusk made his recommendations to the President in a 
memorandum dated November 11, 1961. Rusk addressed the question o f American 
national interests in specific terms. “The deteriorating situation in South Vietnam 
requires attention to the nature and scope o f the United States national interests in that 
country. The loss o f South Vietnam would make pointless any further discussion about
the importance of Southeast Asia to the free world; we would have to face the near 
certainty that the remainder o f Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move to a complete 
accommodation with Communism, if not formal incorporation with the Communist bloc. 
The United States, as a member o f SEATO, has commitments with respect to South 
Vietnam under the protocol to the SEATO Treaty ... the loss o f South Vietnam to 
Communism would not only destroy SEATO but would undermine the credibility of 
American commitments elsewhere. Further, loss o f South Vietnam would stimulate bitter 
domestic controversies in the United States and would be seized upon by extreme 
elements to divide the country and harass the Administration.” Rusk concluded his 
recommendation by stating the introduction of a large military force was not warranted at 
that time and the major effort by the United States should be to improve and better equip 
the South Vietnamese armed forces to deal more effectively with their own insurgency.
Even though President Kennedy decided against the introduction o f American 
combat forces in 1961, it was clear that the principal members o f the National Security 
Council were in basic agreement that South Vietnam constituted a vital national interest 
o f the United States and had to be protected by United States armed forces if  that became 
necessary. All the key players in this drama in 1961, with the exception o f President 
Kennedy, were still the principal policy-makers in 1964-1965 when President Johnson
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made the final and fatal decision to fully commit the United States to protect South 
Vietnam by the introduction of a major military task force to the region.
As the Pentagon Papers so clearly illuminate, the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations did not blunder into an expansive war in Southeast Asia, but actually 
weighed the costs as they saw them against the benefits they hoped to achieve by 
committing the United States to the defense o f South Vietnam. The major failing, 
however, was in conceptualizing our national interest in almost entirely idealistic terms. 
None of the inner circle o f advisors every raised the more realistic question o f if  South 
Vietnam ultimately did fall into the hands o f the Communists, in and o f itself, what 
strategic impact would that have on the United States. The overzealous interpretation of 
George Kennan’s theory o f containment, as outlined in the Domino Theory, and our 
inability and unwillingness to distinguish between the relative importance o f various 
countries led the decision-makers to believe that a zero-sum game was being conducted 
with the Communists. Any gain by the Communists by definition had to be a loss to the 
United States. This single-mindedness combined with a huge and seemingly 
inexhaustible power base, militarily and economically, blinded our policy-makers to the 
more urgent questions o f national interest. They were never forced to make realistic 
appraisals and establish priorities. One o f the great ideological fallacies o f the Cold War,
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that still lingers today, is the fact that just because the United States can do something, 
does not necessarily mean it should do something.
An even more disturbing reality was the very fact the United States had involved 
itself was a compelling reason for our continued involvement. America’s prestige and 
worthiness as an ally was on the line. According to George Ball, “...we transmuted our 
perception o f the war from a conflict between North and South Vietnam into a test o f our 
will and ability to stay the course - and, by a breathtaking leap in logic, a test of our 
credibility as a dependable ally anywhere in the world. We had to win because we had 
told Vietnam we would do so, and if we did not prevail, who would trust us in 
Berlin?” 100 The question o f prestige should not be underestimated. As America was 
being pulled further into the abyss, the predominant reasoning o f staying the course in 
Vietnam despite growing disillusionment among the populace and the ever increasing 
unrest on campuses across the country, was the fact that America had never “lost” a war 
and this was not the time to start. David Halberstam discusses this at length in his treatise 
on the decision-makers and the decision-making process o f the Vietnam conflict, The 
Best and the Brightest: “The commitment was already operative, burning with a special 
fuel o f its own - bureaucratic momentum and individual ambition - men let loose in 
Saigon and Washington, who never questioned whether that something was right or
100 Ball, Diplomacy For a Crowded World, p. 49.
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wrong, or whether it worked or not. In government it is always easier to go forward with 
a program that does not work that to stop it all together and admit failure.” 101
Writing in 1965, as President Johnson was poised at the precipice o f total 
commitment in Vietnam, Hans J. Morgenthau tries to show that a withdrawal from 
Vietnam would not destroy the prestige of the United States, but would rather be a 
temporary setback. “The prestige of a nation is not determined by the success or failure 
o f a particular operation at a particular moment in history. Quite the contrary, it reflects 
the sum total of a nation’s qualities and actions, of its successes and failures, o f its
1 IPhistoric memories and aspirations.” “ (my emphasis) Realists continually reassess their 
policy decisions in more pragmatic terms of costs versus benefits, and stand ready to 
abandon a poorly conceived policy if the costs outweigh any potential gains. Ideologues, 
on the other hand, view issues in terms of universal moral truths and, as such, are far less 
likely to give up on a policy once it has been decided upon because that would mean they 
would have to compromise their principles in the process. Unfortunately, in the case of 
Vietnam, idealism won out over interests.
101 David Malbcrstam, The Best and the Brightest, (New York: Penguin, 1972), p.261.
102 Mans J. Morgenthau, Vietnam and the United States, p. 10.
Another pervasive problem area was the lack o f long-term policy planning in the
103Kennedy and Johnson administrations, as there had been in earlier administrations. ' 
Crisis management was taking the place o f policy planning. Advocates o f this approach 
to foreign affairs, armed with the success o f the Cuban missile crisis, instilled the belief 
that an American president, so far as possible, must ‘preserve his options’. What this 
encouraged in Vietnam, and still does, is an ad hoc approach to crisis situations. It 
discouraged efforts to rigorously examine long-range objectives or estimate anticipated 
costs and associated risks in any given situation. This provides a planning tool to guide 
decision makers in determining how far a given course of action should be pursued, and 
more importantly, when it should be terminated. Because no benchmark o f success was 
ever firmly established, the graduated response insidiously drew America into the morass 
o f the Vietnam tragedy. President Johnson was unable to find an acceptable balance 
between the idealistic impulses of Jefferson and the pragmatic realism o f Hamilton. This 
lack o f balance and his decision not to aggressively solicit the support o f the American 
public would set the stage for failure in Vietnam and ultimately cost him the Presidency.
103 For a thorough discussion o f  the National Security Council (NSC) within the various administrations, 
see John Prados, The Keepers o f  the Keys: A History o f  the National Security Council from  Truman to 
Bush, (New York: William Morrow, 1991).
Henry Kissinger provides a fitting epitaph for the failings of four Presidents and 
their inability to balance the exigencies of America’s national interest and the pervasive 
tendency towards idealism in formulating foreign policy.
“America, at any rate, paid a price for its adventure in Vietnam that was 
out of proportion to any conceivable gain. It was clearly a mistake to have 
staked so much on ill-defined causes. America had become involved in 
the first place because it applied literally the maxims o f its successful 
European policy to a region with radically different political, social, and 
economic conditions. Wilsonian idealism permitted no cultural 
differentiation, while the theory of collective security held that, security 
being indivisible, the fabric of the entire international order would unravel 
if even one strand were pulled out. Too idealistic to base its policy on 
national interest, and too focused on the requirements o f general war in its 
strategic doctrine, America was unable to master an unfamiliar strategic 
problem in which the political and military objectives were entwined. 
Imbued with the belief in the universal appeal o f its values, America vastly 
underestimated the obstacles to democratize in a society shaped by 
Confucianism, and among a people who were struggling for political 
identity in the midst o f an assault by outside forces.” 104
10,1 Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 698-699.
CHAPTER SIX 
THE PERSIAN GULF: A BALANCE FOUND
“During the summer of 1990, the world was still in the euphoria over the 
end o f the Cold War and the new more peaceful world that it portended. 
For 1989 had certainly been the annus mirabilis - the miracle year - in 
which the international order had been remade. The East-West 
confrontation was over. The communist regimes in Eastern Europe had 
collapsed, along with the Berlin Wall itself, the greatest symbol o f the 
Cold War. The Soviet Union was in the midst o f a profound 
transformation arising not only from political and economic change, but
also from the eruption o f long-repressed ethnic nationalism  At 2:00
a.m., on August 2, 1990, the illusions were ripped away. A hundred 
thousand Iraqi troops began their invasion of Kuwait...And so, the first 
post-Cold War crisis turned out to be a geopolitical oil crisis.” 105
Daniel Yergin
Saddam Hussein provides the first wake-up call of the post-Cold War era. When 
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded the oil-rich sheikdom o f Kuwait on August 2, 
1990, and shattered the euphoria o f the emerging post-Cold War era, the memories of the 
Vietnam experience still lingered. President Bush was keenly aware o f the pitfalls 
experienced by his predecessors in Vietnam, and, apparently, had learned his lessons
105 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest fo r  Oil, Money, and Power, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1992), pp. 769-770.
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well. Unlike Kennedy and Johnson, Bush brought to the presidency a healthy respect for 
and working knowledge o f diplomacy and power politics. Bush, more than any modern 
President, was prepared to use force as an acceptable instrument of national policy, when 
vital American interests were at stake, and the benefits of military action outweighed the 
potential risks. Stating a basic tenet o f Clausewitzean doctrine, Bush described his basic 
approach to foreign policy development and implementation: “We will integrate every 
available and suitable policy instrument into a multi-faceted approach. That means using 
negotiations, intelligence, economic strength, and yes, military power.” 106 Morgenthau 
would most certainly classify Bush as falling on the Hamiltonian side o f the foreign 
policy spectrum. It should be noted that most of Bush’s inner circle of advisors, 
especially his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, were of a like mindset and 
political predisposition. The importance of “having the President’s ear” should not be 
underestimated. Scowcroft had almost unlimited access to the President throughout the 
crisis in the Persian Gulf, and next to the President himself, was the most hawkish 
member of the Bush inner circle. Andrew Rosenthal, a columnist for the New York 
Times, described the dealings o f the Bush inner circle: “These internal deliberations have 
been conducted in classic Bush fashion, in the smallest circle of advisors. Indeed, the
106 Quoted in Los Angeles Times, March 15, 1991, p. 8.
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President and his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, have spent hours together, 
often with fishing lines trailing in the Atlantic Ocean off Mr. Bush’s speedboat.”107
The decision by President Bush and his advisors to deploy American troops in
response to Saddam Hussein’s “naked aggression” was motivated almost entirely by the
strategic importance o f oil and its continued supply to the United States and other western
economies. Oil and its accessibility at reasonable and stable prices was of, and still is, of
vital importance to the health of the American economy, and had been since the Second
World War. Daniel Yergin, president o f Cambridge Research Associates states: “Until
some alternative source of energy is found, oil will still have far-reaching effects on the
global economy; major price movements can fuel economic growth or, ...drive inflation
and kick off recessions. Today oil is the only commodity whose doings and controversies
108are to be found regularly not only on the business page, but also on the front page.” 
Yergin continues, saying that the changing geopolitical and geo-economic situation in the 
aftermath o f the Cold War has intensified the strategic importance o f oil in the emerging 
world order. “With the end of the Cold War, a new world order is taking shape. 
Economic competition, regional struggles, and ethnic rivalries may replace ideology as 
the focus o f international, and national, conflict...but whatever the evolution of this new
1117 Andrew Rosenthal, “The G olf Cart Crisis”, New York Times, August 26, 1990, p. A 16.
108 Daniel Yergin, “Oil: The Strategic Prize” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The G u lf War 
Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, (New York: Times Books, 1991), pp. 23-24.
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international order, oil will remain the strategic commodity, critical to national strategies 
and international politics.” 109
It did not take long for worry to become reality. The Dow Jones industrial 
average closed down 55 points after plunging 120 points in the first day o f trading after 
the invasion o f Kuwait.110 Some argued that a dollar or two increase in the price of a 
barrel o f crude oil could not possibly wreak the economic havoc that the financial 
markets seemed to be forecasting, but as a rule of thumb, an increase o f five to six dollars 
in the price o f a barrel o f middle East crude, which was anticipated if Saddam Hussein’s 
invasion and annexation o f Kuwait was allowed to stand, would result in a rise o f about 
12 to 15 cents at the gas pumps. Americans argued that the United States should not fight 
a war over the price o f gasoline, but they did not take into account the economic ripple 
effect that kind of increase would have on an already weakened economy. Each one-cent 
rise in the price of gasoline means that consumers would spend roughly one billion 
dollars less on other goods and services.111 There should be no doubt that oil and its 
economic impact were the primary motivation o f President Bush and his policy advisors 
when they decided to use force to pursue their policies in the Persian Gulf.
109 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
110 Matthew L. Wald, “Price o f Oil Rises: Stocks in Retreat”, New York Times, August 4, 1991, pp. A l,
A6.
111 David E. Rosenbaum, “Deeper Economic Uncertainties Confront U.S. Policy Makers”, New York 
Times, August 4, 1990, p. A6.
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President Bush and his key advisors were quite candid - almost to their detriment 
- about basing their decision to send troops to the Persian Gulf on the geopolitical 
importance o f oil, and the control o f oil and oil reserves. In a nationally televised speech, 
President Bush outlined his reasons for sending troops to the Gulf. Tucked in between all 
the moralistic reasons for standing up to Hussein, is a clear reference to the strategic 
importance o f oil and its effect on the economy. “Our economy imports nearly half the 
oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence. Much o f the 
world is even more dependent upon imported oil and is even more vulnerable to Iraqi 
threats.” 112 Speaking to Pentagon official on August 15, 1990, the President 
reemphasized this point: “Our jobs, our way o f life, our freedom and the freedom of 
friendly countries around the world would suffer if control o f the world’s great oil
I 1 1reserves would fall into the hands o f Saddam Hussein.”
Bush almost made a fatal mistake of justifying the use o f military force almost 
exclusively in terms o f national interest, but quickly, and correctly, realized that the 
American public, according to George Ball, “want sentimental tears with its policies.”114
112 George Bush, “ Iraq Invasion o f  Kuwait: The Defense o f  Saudi Arabia” , delivered at the White House, 
August 8, 1990, Vital Speeches o f  the Day, Vol. LVI, No. 22, (September 1, 1990), p. 674.
113 As quoted in R.W. Apple, “Bush Says Iraqi Aggression Threatens Our Way o f  Life” , New York Times, 
August 16, 1990, p. A 14.
114 Ball, Diplomacy fo r  a Crowded World, p. 53.
The President and his advisors adjusted their public statements to emphasize more 
moralistically acceptable justifications for the Persian Gulf policy to satisfy the 
Jeffersonian impulses inherent in the American political tradition. In November, when 
the decision was made to move from a defensive to an offensive posture, his public 
approval ratings actually dropped, indicating that he had not yet found the proper balance, 
at least in the public’s eye, between national interest concerns and moralistic justification 
- the opposite problem Kennedy and Johnson had. Bush mounted a determined and 
deliberate effort to gain United Nations approval to conduct military operations against 
the Iraqi army. The primary impetus for gaining U.N. approval was to build a solid 
idealistic foundation upon which to gain the support o f the American public, which he 
realized was the key to any successful employment o f American military forces. 
President Bush further legitimized his actions in the Gulf by building an unprecedented 
international coalition playing the idealistic tramp card o f collective security. To solidify 
his case with the American people, Bush went the extra mile to secure the approval of 
Congress - which he never admitted was necessary for him to use force against Iraq. All 
these actions had the express purpose of getting the positive force o f public support 
behind the military action he was about to take in the deserts of Southwest Asia. Bush, 
unlike Johnson, understood the validity of Henry Kissinger’s “iron test” of foreign policy, 
and the vital importance o f harmonizing the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian impulses
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which are inextricably ingrained in the American political experience. Bush triumphed 
where Johnson failed.
Some very important lessons are to be learned from the successes and failures of 
the Persian Gulf War. Both the military and the political leaders were determined not to 
make the same mistakes that plagued their predecessors in Vietnam. The interaction and 
cooperation between the Bush and his military commanders was exemplary. The guiding 
maxim that military action is purely politics by other means was embedded in Bush’s 
approach to the conflict. Once the President had clearly stated his political objectives; 
the liberation o f Kuwait and the protection o f Saudi Arabia and the other oil producing 
nations o f the Persian Gulf, he let the generals do their jobs. Unlike President Johnson, 
Bush did not micro-manage the war effort as LBJ did during his famous Tuesday lunch 
strategy sessions, but rather decided what the overall political goal o f the operation 
should be and then did his job o f building public consensus and support around that goal. 
The principle failing o f the Vietnam conflict was the lack o f a clearly stated political 
objective to guide our actions, measure our success and determine when to disengage. 
After ten years, fifty thousand American lives, and the disillusionment o f an entire 
generation, the primary objective o f the Vietnam War was purely to extricate ourselves, 
or as Nixon put it, to achieve “peace with honor”. Without the compass of a clearly
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conceived and defined political goal based on the national interest, America was doomed 
to languish in the quagmire o f Vietnam.
President Bush would not repeat this fatal error. Armed with a vision o f what was 
to be accomplished, Bush built an unprecedented military force and political coalition of 
disparate nations, laid a firm foundation of public support, and executed an almost 
flawless forty-three day aerial campaign and hundred-hour ground assault which liberated 
Kuwait, decimated the Iraqi military machine, and damaged Saddam Hussein’s nuclear 
and chemical weapons programs. Once his objectives were met, the president ended the 
war and sued for peace. Bush had set the goal of getting Hussein out of Kuwait, not the 
total destruction o f his evil regime. His primary purpose was to reestablish an acceptable 
balance o f power in the Persian Gulf, not impose an American prescription for political 
reform. The president, the military, and the American public knew exactly where they 
were going before they started down the road to war.
The military also incorporated lessons learned from Vietnam in their approach to 
the war in the Gulf. General Colin Powell, Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff, was 
committed to a doctrine of overwhelming force. His entire strategy was to assemble a 
force strong enough to guarantee a military success while minimizing Allied casualties. 
Powell knew all to well that the longer a conflict drags on and casualties increase, the
more difficult it becomes to foster and maintain the public support required to see the 
conflict through to a successful conclusion. CNN brought the Gulf War into the living 
rooms o f the American public in real time and around the clock. Wars were now fought, 
not in some faraway country, but right before your eyes in the privacy o f your own home. 
The real costs o f military actions, death and destruction, were put in plain view o f an 
increasingly knowledgeable and sophisticated public audience. The people could see the 
price being paid. Politicians no longer had unlimited expense accounts. The American 
public would have to know exactly what they were buying and decide if  it was worth the 
price.
The Persian Gulf War had been an impressive demonstration o f American 
military power and President Bush’s skills as a diplomat and politician. But many have 
argued it was an incomplete victory. Four years after the United States achieved a 
‘decisive victory’ over Iraq, the American military still finds itself engaged in an open- 
ended police action, flying air patrols in northern and southern Iraq. Three and a half 
years later, some o f the same Republican Guard forces that Powell thought had been 
largely destroyed again menaced Kuwait, resulting in some of the same American 
military units that took on the Iraqis in 1991 being ordered back to the Gulf to prevent a 
possible second invasion o f Kuwait by Iraq. In response to Bush’s critics, one has to ask 
what would have resulted if Iraqi forces were completely vanquished and Saddam
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Hussein was forced from power. With a resurgent and more pragmatic Iran acquiring 
more and better weapons from a growing Russian arms trade, what would prove more 
dangerous to U.S. interests in the Middle East: a power vacuum created by the total 
dismantling o f Iraq’s military and political infrastructure, or a substantially weakened, but 
still intact Iraq? These concerns were addressed as can be seen in a memorandum from 
Zalmay Khlilzad, director o f policy planning at the State Department to Robert 
Wolfowitz.
“There is a danger that the overthrow[of Hussein] might be followed by 
more substantial instability and chaos. This can happen if the armed 
forces disintegrate and different factions fight each other. Ethnic groups 
such as the Kurds might declare independence from Iraq. Iraq’s neighbors 
such as Iran, Syria, and even Turkey might either seize parts o f Iraqi 
territory or establish governments to their liking in areas adjacent to them - 
in effect partitioning Iraq into several countries. The most dangerous of 
these would be Iranian occupation o f any part o f Iraqi territory. And, 
should Syria and Turkey take over parts o f Iraq, it is likely to be very 
difficult to stop the Iranians from doing the same.
The partitioning o f Iraq will not serve our long-term interests. Iraqi 
disintegration will improve prospects for Iranian domination o f the Gulf 
and remove a restraint on Syria. It will sow the seeds fro future wars.
Should Iraqi forces begin to disintegrate, we might become the principle 
power interested in maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity.” 115
A more basic question, however, is how far should a military action go? When 
does a nation declare victory? Bush clearly defined his political objective as the
115 Memo to Wolfowitz from Zalmay Khalilzad, director o f policy planning, quoted in Gordon and 
Trainer, The G eneral's War, p. 516.
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implementation o f United Nations Resolution 686. Once Iraq was expelled from Kuwait, 
and the ancillary objectives o f destroying Hussein’s nuclear and chemical weapons 
development program, eliminating the SCUD missile threat, and substantially reducing 
the ranks o f Iraq’s crack troops, the Republican Guard, President Bush stopped the war. 
Bush insisted after the war, “It was never our goal to break up Iraq. Indeed, we did not 
want that to happen, and most o f our coalition partners (especially the Arabs) felt even 
stronger on the issue.” 116 The President had achieved a stunning and impressive victory 
in the Persian Gulf War. Bush had learned the lessons o f Vietnam, but even more 
importantly, went back to America’s political beginnings to learn the lessons o f the 
Founding Fathers. President Bush’s most important accomplishment was finding a 
balance between the Hamiltonian impulse of basing foreign policy decisions on the 
pragmatic realities o f national interest, and the idealistic vision o f Jefferson that has 
fueled this country’s most noble achievements.
1,6 President Bush’s written response to Questions Regarding the Persian G ulf War, June 13, 1994, quoted 
in ihiil., p. 456.
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE UNCERTAINTY OF A POST-COLD WAR WORLD
“In a new era o f peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to 
expand and strengthen the world’s community o f market-based 
democracies. During the Cold War, we sought to contain a threat to 
survival o f free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle o f nations 
that live under those free institutions, for our dream is o f a day when the 
opinions and energies o f every person in the world will be given full 
expression in a world of thriving democracies that cooperate with each 
other and live in peace.” 117
President Bill Clinton
For the third time this century, America is outlining its vision for a new 
world order. Bill Clinton is carrying on the tradition o f his presidential predecessors by 
painting his vision o f the future on an ideological canvas. The end o f the Cold War and 
the collapse o f Communism, the defining forces that have shaped world politics for the 
last forty years, brought with them hope for a new world order. For the third time in the 
“American century”, the United States trumpeted its desire and commitment to build a
117 President Bill Clinton, “Confronting the Challenges o f  a Broader World” address to the U.N. General 
Assembly, New York, September 27, 1993, in Dispatch (U.S. Department o f  State), Vol. 4, No. 39., 
(September 27, 1993), p. 650.
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new world order in its own image based on the lofty principles o f liberty, self-
determination, human rights and collective security. America’s power is supreme. Yet,
power has become more diffuse and the strategic value o f military strength has
diminished. Kissinger persuasively argues that “the victory in the Cold War has
propelled America into a world which bears many similarities to the European state
system o f the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and practices which American
statesmen and thinkers have consistently questioned. The absence o f both an overriding
ideological or strategic threat frees nations to pursue foreign policies based increasingly
118on their immediate national interest.”
Saddam Hussein’s invasion o f the sheikdom o f Kuwait and the subsequent 
Persian Gulf War threw some cold water on the new geopolitical realities into the face of 
the ideological wishful thinking o f American leaders. The crisis in the Gulf was the wake 
up call. The emerging pattern o f international relations in the post-Cold War era is much 
more in line with Henry Kissinger’s pragmatic assessment o f the geopolitical 
environment that is evolving, than the idealistic hopes expressed by Bush and Clinton.
The American military is being caught in a vise between the growing number o f regional 
brush fires and the drastic downsizing that was mandated by the “peace dividend”
118 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 805.
realized when the Cold War was won. President Clinton’s crusading vision o f collective 
security under the auspices o f the United Nations has the military engaged to an 
unprecedented degree around the globe in numerous and varied policing or humanitarian 
actions. Coincidental with this feverish operational tempo, the military is downsizing to 
pre-Vietnam levels. The morale of military members is suffering as they are deployed to 
remote and hostile locations more frequently and for longer periods o f time. Readiness is 
being compromised as increasingly limited funds are being diverted from equipment 
maintenance and combat training budgets to subsidize the costs o f all these military 
actions. A reassessment o f national priorities in light o f this emerging geopolitical 
landscape is an absolute necessity.
The final evacuation o f the United Nations peacekeepers from the beaches of 
Somalia begs the question: why were we there? General Mohammed Farah Aidid and 
the other Somali warlords are in much the same position as they were when the operation 
began. $1.6 billion, 38,000 troops brought in and taken out, and 122 peacekeepers killed. 
Did the pathetic end to the United Nations peacekeeping mission justify these means? 
Absolutely not! What vital American national interest was at stake? A disturbing 
proclivity towards idealistically-based foreign policy decisions is becoming a hallmark of 
the Clinton administration. Bosnia-Herzegovina is no different. The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), one o f the most successful and enduring military and
political alliances is faltering and is approaching a very precarious precipice. If the 
Europeans are not willing to involve themselves in the Bosnia crisis, which is in their 
back yard, how can the United States justify risking even one American life in the name 
of collective security? Without the military strength and political leadership o f the 
United States, their is no collective security. The United Nations is a panacea for 
countries looking for moralistic clothing for the naked pursuit o f their national interest. 
Many nations clamor to support these idealistic endeavors, but do so under the umbrella 
o f U.S. military strength and economic power. They reap the rewards o f international 
recognition and respectability at very little expense. The armada o f the Americas, so 
skillfully engineered and orchestrated by President Clinton to assist in the effort to restore 
democracy to the tiny island nation o f Haiti is ludicrous to the point o f being laughable. 
Belize provided a military band and there were no Mexicans policing the streets o f Port 
au Prince!
It has been frequently asserted that the foreign policy o f the United States pursues 
no objectives apart from those o f the United Nations, that, in other words, the foreign 
policy is actually identical with the United Nations. The fact that all the military actions 
that have been undertaken by the United States in the post-Cold War era, including the 
Persian Gulf War, have been pursued under the banner o f the United Nations would 
strongly support this deduction. However, it is impossible for the United Nations to
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pursue interests apart from those o f the member states which dominate the United 
Nation’s policy-forming bodies. The identity between the interests o f the United Nations 
and the United States can, and should, only refer to the successful policies o f the United 
States within the United Nations through which the support o f the United Nations is 
being secured for the policies of the United States. The United States is the originator of 
its policies and interests, the United Nations simply legitimizes them.
Now, more than ever, as this great nation approaches the twenty-first century, the 
truths so evident to our Founding Fathers must once again be revisited. Arthur 
Schlesinger, in the true fashion of a historian, looks to the future with a foot in the past. 
“Ideology is out o f character for Americans. Dogma does the republic grievous damage, 
above all, in foreign policy. In thinking about international relations, American would do 
well to sober up from the ideological binge and return to the cold gray realism o f the 
Founding Fathers, men who lucidly understood the role of national interest and force in a 
dangerous world and thought that saving America was enough without trying to save all 
humanity as well.”119
The world is still a dangeous place!
119 Schlesinger, pp. 67-68.
APPENDIX ONE 
CHRON O LOGY OF IM PORTANT EVENTS: 
TH E VIETNAM  W AR
1946.............................France begins the battle against Viet Minh for control o f  Vietnam.
194 9.............................China falls to Mao’s Red Army.
195 0.............................President Truman gives France $10 million in financial aid to
assist in the fight against the Vietnamese insurgents. Am erican 
invovlement in Vietnam begins.
1952............................. President Truman’s National Security Council (NSC)
Memorandum states that in Southeast Asia “the loss o f any single
country would probably lead to relatively swift submission to or 
alignment with Communism by the remaining countries o f this 
group ... Dominoes would continue to fall because an alignment 
with Communism of the rest o f Southeast Asia and India, and in 
the longer term, the Middle E a s t... would progressively follow. 
Such widespread alignment would endanger the security and 
stability o f Europe.” The Domino Theory is horn.
1954
M arch..........................The battle at Dien Bien Phu begins.
May 7 ..........................The French lose Dien Bien Phu to Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh.
The loss o f Dien Bien Phu dealt a death blow to French morale. 
Opposition in France to the war reached a peak, forcing a complete 
and rapid withdrawal of the French from all of Indochina.
May 8 ..........................Geneva Conference on Indochina. Vietnam is divided between
North and South by the 17th parallel. The United States did not 
sign agreement, but states that it wouod view a renewal of
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aggression “ ... with grave concern as seriously threatening 
international peace and security.
July 7 ...........................Ngo Dinh Diem is appointed Premier o f Vietnam in Saigon.
October 11..................The Viet Minh, headed by Ho Chi Minh, formally take over
control o f Hanoi and North Vietnam.
1955
February 12.................The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) takes over
the training o f South Vietnamese army from the French.
February 19................Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) covering
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam comes into force.
October 23 .................. Former Emperor and Head o f State o f Vietnam, Bao Dia, is
deposed by national referendum.
October 26 .................. The Republic o f South Vietnam is established with Ngo Dinh
Diem as president.
1956
July 6 ........................... U.S. vice President Richard M. Nixon visits Vietnam.
1961
January........................Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev announces that the Soviet Union
intends to support “wars o f national liberation.”
January 2 9 .................. Creation o f communist-led National Front for Liberation o f South
Vietnam (NFLSV) announced in Saigon ... “sacred historical task” 
of NFLSV is to “overthrow Diem - U.S. clique and liberate the 
South.”
May 5 .......................... President Kennedy declares at a press conference that
consideration is being given to the use of U.S. forces, if  necessary, 
to help South Vietnam resist communist pressures.
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May 11 ........................Vice President Lyndon Johnson arrives in South Vietnam, a joint
communique on May 13th decalres that additional U.S. military 
and economic aid will be given to help South Vietnam in its fight 
against communist guerilla forces.
May 16 ........................An international conference on Laos is held in Geneva. 15 nations
signed a treaty in which they pledged to recognize a new neutralist 
coalition government in Laos, withdraw any military forces they 
held in the country, and to stop any paramilitary assistnace to the 
rival political factions in the country. North Vietnam is the only 
country not to sign the treaty.
August 2 ......................President kennedy declares that the United States will do all it can
to save South Vietnam from communism.
October 11...................President Kennedy announces he is sending General Maxwell
Taylor to South Vietnam to investigate the military situation and to 
report back to him personally.
December 8 ................U.S. State Department publishes “white paper” that states South
Vietnam is threatened by a “clear and present danger” of 
communist conquest.
1962
February 7 ..................Two U.S. Army support companies, totalling 300 men, arrive in
Saigon, raising the total of U.S. personnel in South Vietnam to 
4000.
February 8 ..................U.S. Military Assistance Command - Vietnam (MACV) is
established.
1963
April 2 2 ...................... U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk calls the situation in South
Vietnam “difficult and dangerous” and says that the U.S. “cannot 
promise or expect a quick victory”, and that its role is “limited and 
supporting.”
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May 8 ..........................Riots erupt in city of Hue in northern South Vietnam during a
Buddhist celebration.
June 3 ..........................Buddhist demonstrations break out in Hue. Martial law is imposed.
June 11 ........................A Buddhist monk commits suicide by burning himslf to death.
Furhter aggrivates religious crisis in South Vietnam. Pictures o f 
the monk, burning with hands clasped in prayer, were on the front 
pages o f almost all U.S. newspapers. Storms o f outrage broke out 
in U.S. and Europe when Buddhist suicides began.
August 2 1 ................... Martial law imposed by President Diem after police and South
Vienamese troops raided a Buddhist temple in Saigon.
August 2 2 ................... U.S. State Department issues statement deploring Diem’s actions
against the Buddhist temples.
August 2 9 ....................President Kennedy declares, in an interview with Walter Cronkite,
that the U.S. is prepared to continue to assist South Vietnam, “but I 
don’t think that the war can be won unless the people support the 
effort, and, in my opinion, in the last two months the government 
(South Vietnam) has gotten out o f touch with the people.”
September 2 4 .............Secretary o f Defense Robert McNamara and General Taylor arrive
in South Vietnam.
October 2 .....................Secretary o f Defense McNamara and General Taylor report to the
President and the National Security Council. The statement says 
the U.S. will continue its “policy o f working with the people and 
government o f South Vietnam to deny this country to communism 
and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency 
of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance 
in this undertaking is the central object in our policy in South 
Vietnam.”
October 27.................. Buddhist monk burns himself to death in Saigon. (The 7th since
June 11).
November 1................ Coup against President Diem is successful. Rebels assassinate
Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. A period o f prolonged, 
chaotic leadership ensued. In two years, South Vietnam endured
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ten changes of government and even more changes in the military 
high command.
November 22 ............. President Kennedy is assassinated in Dallas. Lyndon Johnson
becomes the President of the United States.
November 24............. President Johnson affirms U.S. intention to continue its military
and economic support of South Vietnam in its struggle against the 
communist Viet Cong. U.S. forces in South Vietnam now 
num bered over 16.000.
1964
April 2 5 ...................... General Westmoreland replaces General Harkins as Commander-in
Chief MACV.
August 2 ..................... U.S.S. Maddox is attacked in international waters off North
Vietnam coast by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.
August 4 ...................... U.S.S. C. Turner Joy and Maddox are attacked by North
Vietnamese PT boats. Preisdent Johnsonorders U.S. “air action” 
against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North 
Vietnam.”
August 7 .......................President Johnson sends Congress the Southeast Asia Resolution,
or as it is more commonly called, the G ulf o f Tonkin Resolution. 
It stated that the attacks were “part o f a deliberate and systematice 
campaign o f aggression that the communsit regime in North 
Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations 
joined with them in the collective defense o f their freedom.” It 
resolved “that Congress approves and supports the determination 
o f the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary 
measures to repel any armed aggression against the forces o f the 
United States and to prevent further aggression.”
.......................Congress overwhelming apporves the Gulf o f Tonkin Resolution:
House voted 416 to 0 in favor; the Senate passed it 88 to 2.
1965
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February 6 .................. Soviet Premier Kosygin arrives in Hanoi.
February 7 .................. After a bold Viet Cong attack on American installations near the
South Vietnamese city o f Pleiku, President Johnson authorizes 
retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam. Within days, the 
original idea of carefully calibrated retaliatory strikes against the 
North was replaced by a program of sustained bombing, which 
had long been sought after by the military leadership. The 
bombing campaign was code-named “Rolling Thunder”. The 
President and his personal advisors approved specific target 
lists during the President’s “Tuesday Lunch”. President 
Johnson often joked that the military couldn’t bomh an 
outhouse without his approval.
February 8 .................. Premier Koysigin announces Soviet willingness to aid North
Vietnam, if North Vietnam is invaded.
Spring.......................... Despite the sustained bombing o f North Vietnam, the situation in
the South continues to deteriorate. President Johnson has strong 
public support for his policies in Vietnam; before Pleiku. 
about 41 percent of the American public approved of his 
Vietnam policy. After Rolling Thunder began, approval 
climbed to 60 percent. 83 percent supported the bombing 
campaign, and 79 percent supported the goal o f “keeping the 
communists from taking over all o f Southeast Asia.”
March 8 ....................... Two U.S. Marine battalions wade ashore on the beaches south of
Da Nang in South Vietnam.
April 1 ..........................U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Maxwell Taylor attends a
meeting o f the U.S. Intelligence Board. He remains committed to 
saving South Vietnam, but brings out reservations about 
committing U.S. combat troops to South Vietnam. Tavlor said 
that once the U.S. started down the slippery slope, their would 
be no stopping. He goes on to state that once the Rubicon is 
crossed, there will he no turing hack.
July 21..........................Secretary o f Defense McNamara reported to NSC that the miliary
picture was rapidly deteriorating. He recommended the President 
send another 100,000 troops to Vietnam by October, and said that
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another 100,000 might be needed in early 1966. McNamara also 
suggested the administration ask Congress for the authority to call 
up 235,000 reserves.
...........................The President faced a serious dilemma. McNamara’s proposal
would cost up to $8 billion, but the President hesitated to 
mobilize the country behind the war effort because he feared it 
would endanger his Great Society programs pending in 
Congress, he was convinced that any action focusing on the war 
would undermine the prospects o f his domestic programs. He 
decided to pursue a policy of guns and butter. He purposely 
played down the increasing involvement o f the United States in the 
war.
July 2 5 .........................President Johnson meets with key advisors at Camp David to
debate what policy to pursue in Vietnam.
July 28 ......................... Instead o f a nationally televised speech during prime time,
President Johnson simply disclosed the major troop buildup 
during a middav press conference. Even though he secretly 
approved an increase of 100,000 troops by year’s end, with the 
possibility o f 100,000 more in early 1966. he only referred to an 
increase of 50.000. He told reporters that these additional trrops 
did “not imply any change in policy whatsoever.” Thus, many 
believe President Johnson made the fatal mistake that would 
lead, ultimately, to his politcal downfall: he did not mobilize 
the American public behind this significant increase in the 
level of the war effort. In fact, he purposely deceived the 
public by significantly understating the actual troop increases.
Summer 1965 -
end of 1967................U.S. troop strength in Vietnam grew from 75,000 to 485,000.
Casualities rose dramatically from 400 killed in action before July 
1965 to more than 16,000 by the end o f 19667. The American 
public began to tire o f the war. Domestic controversy over the war 
effort grew steadily. Growing casualities and increasing television 
coverage o f the “first living-room war” began to create pockets o f 
opposition to the war throughout the country.
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October 31 ..................At the “Tuesday Lunch”, McNamara airs his serious doubts over
the President’s Vietnam policy. He states that “continuation o f our 
present course o f action in Southeast Asia would be dangerous, 
costly in lives, and unsatisfactory to the American people.” (It 
should be noted that McNamara was on o f the most ardent and 
persausive supporters of military action in Vietnam.)
November 1................The first meeting o f what would become referred to as the “wise
men” took place. This group o f elder statesmen was brought 
together to debate the war in Vietnam and where it was headed. 
Members o f the group included: Dean Acheson, General Omar 
Bradley, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, former Treasury 
Secretary Douglas Dillion, Supreme Court Justice Fortas, former 
Unersecretary o f State Robert Murphy, Averell harriman, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Maxwell Taylor, Secretary o f State Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Clark Clifford. All members 
o f this distinguished group of advisors told President Johnson to 
stand firm in Vietnam. This advice was crucial in strengthening 
the President’s resolve.
1968
January 19.................. Clark Clifford is named as replacement for Secretary o f Defense.
January 2 3 .................. U.S.S. Pueblo, an American intelligence ship, was seized by the
North Koreans. Khe Sahn, in the Northwest comer of South 
Vietnam, manned with over 6,000 U.S. Marines, is surrounded by 
a larger number o f enemy troops, the largest battle o f the Vietnam 
War appeared imminent.
January 3 1 ...................Communist forces begin first major offensive o f the war. It was
timed to coincide with the start of a truce the North Vietnamese 
had pledged to observe during the celebration o f Tet, the 
Vietnamese New Year. The Tet Offencsive was a stunning 
military defeat of the the North Vietnamese. Inspite of this, the 
almost universal theme of the media coverage the U.S. and 
South Vietnam had suffered a diasterous defeat! News media 
accounts of the Tet Offensive intensified the growing 
disillusionment with the war by the American public, thereby 
turning Tet into a political and pvschological victory for North
122
Vietnam. Tet shook the very foundation o f the Johnson 
administration. Gallop polls showed the portion of Americans who 
thought the U.S. was losing the war jumped from 8 percent 
(November 1967) to 23 percent (February 1968). The February 
poll also showed 61 percent o f the U.S. public believed the United 
States was losing ground or standing still in Vietnam.
March 2 5 ..................... The Senior Advisory Group - “the wise men” - meet again. This
time six members favor disengagement from Vietnam, four 
advocate standing firm, and one straddles the fence. (At the 
November meeting, all the advisors had supported the U.S. miltary 
committment to South Vietnam.)
....................................... President Johnson is deeply shaken by the outcome o f the meeting.
He later said, “if they had been so deeply influenced by the reports 
o f the Tet Offensive, what must the average citizen in the country 
be thinking?”
March 3 1 .....................President Johnson announces that he will no t seek another term in
office. He also declares a unilateral halt to all oombing o f North 
Vietnam above the 20th Parallel hoping that Hanoi would take 
reciprocal steps toward peace.
April 4 ......................... Martin Luther King, Jr. is assassinated in Memphis.
June 4 .......................... Robert F. Kennedy is assassinated after winning the California
primary.
October 31...................Five days before the 1968 presidential election, President Johnson
announces that all bombing o f North Vietnam will stop and 
negotiations will begin. Within weeks, Hanoi violated all the
conditions on which the bombing halt had been based. The U.S. 
does nothing. Ho Chi Minh had called our bet, and found out we 
were bluffing!
1969
January 2 0 ................... Richard M. Nixon is inaugurated and becomes the fith U.S.
President in twenty-three years to deal with the dilemma o f 
Vietnam.
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February...................... While negotiations are being held in Paris, the North Vietnamese
and the Viet Cong launch a major offensive in South Vietnam.
March 18.....................President Nixon decides to bamb a North Vietnamese sanctuary in
Cambodia violating Cambodia’s neutrality. The bombing was kept 
secret. Bombing o f communist outposts in Cambodia and Laos 
continue throughout the spring and summer.
May 14 ........................ In a nationally televised address, President Nixon puts forward a
new U.S. peace proposal. The proposal called for a mutual 
withdrawal o f all U.S. and North Vietnamese troops from South 
Vietnam, and for internationally supervised, free elections to 
decide the fate o f South Vietnam.
June 8 ......................... President Nixon meets with President Thieu and announces that the
U.S. was withdrawing 25,000 troops from Vietnam - the first 
reduction since 1961.
July 16......................... The President sends a personal letter to Ho Chi Minh in hopes of
breathing some life into the stalled negotiation.
August 2 5 ....................Ho Chi Minh coldly rebuffs Nixon’s peace proposal, insisting that
the United States unilaterally withdraw from South Vietnam and 
that President Theiu’s government be overthrown.
September 3 ...............Ho Chi Minh dies.
November 3 ................In a nationally-televised speech, the President addresses the
question of what a defeat would mean for South Vietnam, the 
world, and the U.S. He summarizes the reasons for U.S. 
involvement: to stop foreign aggression and to discourage possible 
future aggression by a show of U.S. resolve. The speech becomes 
known as the “silent majority” speech. Telephone polls after the 
speech indicated a 77 percent approval rating fot he President. The 
approval rate for his Vietnam policy jumped to 64 percent.
1970
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April 2 0 ...................... President Nixon announces the withdrawal o f an additional 60,000
troops by the end o f 1970, to be followed by a reduction o f 90,000 
in 1971. The extrication from Vietnam begins.
April 3 0 ....................... The President announces a ground offensive against North
Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia.
June 3 0 ........................Last U.S. troop departs Cambodia.
1971
June 13........................New York Times begins publishing a series o f articles on a
classified Department of Defense study titled “The History o f U.S. 
Decision-Making Process on Vietnam”. The study was more 
commonly referred to as the Pentagon Papers. President Nixon 
decides to block the publication o f the Pentagon Papers, stating 
that the publication o f these articles would seriously endanger
national security.
1972
February..................... Chinese Summit meeting between Mao Zedong and President
Nixon.
March 3 0 .................... North Vietnam launch a massive invasion o f South Vietnam. The
Easter Offensive begins.
May 8 ..........................President Nixon announces the mining o f Haiphon Harbor and the
beginning o f “Linebacker I”, an intensive bombing campaign of 
military targets throughout North Vietnam, including Hanoi itself.
May 2 2 ........................First U.S. - Soviet Summit is held between President Nixon and
President Brezhnev.
June..............................South Vietnamese troops, without the assistnace o f U.S. ground
forces, begin a counter-offensive. By August, most o f the territory 
lost to the North was recaptured. North Vietnam re-open secret
negotiations in Paris.
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October 8.....................In a secret Paris meeting, Hanoi makes a proposal in which it
capitulates on most major issues. Hanoi’s new proposal calls for a 
ceasefire, followed by an American withdrawal, and an exchange 
o f POWs within 60 days. However, they refused to withdraw their 
forces from South Vietnam.
October 18...................This new proposal is presented to Prsident Theiu. He strongly
resists the proposal and suggests over twenty changes to the draft 
agreement, seven of which Hanoi would never agree to.
November 20............. Paris talks reconvene. President Nixon instructs Henry Kissinger
to work tov/ards an agreement along the lines o f the October 8 
proposal. The North Vietnamese harden their position and an 
impasse is reached. Talks recess.
December 4 ............... Talks recovene, but Hanoi is even more obstinent. Kissinger and
President Nixon conclude that Hanoi has made a conscious 
decision to prolong the war. The President decides the North 
needs some incentive to conclude a peace agreement.
December 17............. “Linebacker II” begins. After 12 days o f intense bombing in and
around the Hanoi area, North Vietnam’s war-making capacity is 
shattered. Politically, Hanoi’s will to fight is broken.
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January 8 ....................High-level negotiations are reconvened in Paris. Hanoi agrees to
basic terms within forty-eight hours.
January 2 7 ..................Almost 20 years after the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu,
the Paris Peace Accords are signed, formally ending the longest 
war in United States history.
APPENDIX TWO 
CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS 
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
1990
August 2 ...................... Iraqi troops storm into the shiekdom of Kuwait.
....................... President Bush freezes $30 billion in Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets.
....................... House votes 416 to 0 to endorse the President’s action to impose
trade sanctions and to cut Export/Import Bank credits to Iraq.
....................... Senate unanimously approves a resolution calling for multilateral
actions “involving air, sea, and land forces” under United Nations 
Charter to restore international peace and security to the region.
....................... Soviets suspend military shipments to Iraq.
....................... UN Security Council votes overwhelmingly to condemn Iraq’s
invasion o f Kuwait, demanding the immediate, unconditional 
withdrawal o f the Baghdad troops frm Kuwait, and threatening to 
impose mandatroy sanctions if Iraq doe not immediately comply.
....................... West Europeans unanimously condemn Iraq’s invasion o f Kuwait
with Britain and France joining the United States and freezing 
billions o f dollars of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets. Western Europe 
does not immediately impose trade sanctions.
August 3 ..................... Powerful Iraqi forces wheel into position for a possible attack on
Saudi Arabia.
....................... U.S. asks other members o f the United Nations Security Council to




Japan freezes $20 -30 billion in Kuwaiti assets.
August 6 ...................... U.N. Security council Resolution 661 passes by a 13 - 0 vote.
Yemen and Cuba abstain. Resolution 661 orders a far-reaching 
trade and financial boycott o f Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
August 7 ...................... Decalring that Iraqi forces massed in Kuwait pose an imminent
threat to Saudi Arabia, the United States order the first troops to
Saudi Arabia. O peration Desert Shield begins.
........................The Saudis agree to raise oil production to alleviate growing fears
in the world market o f possible oil shortages caused by the Iraqi 
invasion.
August 8 ..................... President Bush delivers a televised address to the nation, declaring
the the independence o f Suadi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states 
is of “vital interest” to the United States and that a disruption in the 
Saudi oil supply would represent a threat to U.S. “economic 
independence”.
........................Saddam Hussein announces the annexation o f Kuwait.
August 9 ..................... U.N. Security Council Resolution 662 passes unanimously.
Resolution 662 declares Iraqi’s annexation o f Kuwait null and 
void.
...................... The Iraqi government announces that foreigners would not be
allowed to leave Kuwait or Iraq.
August 10................... At a summit meeting in Cairo, 12 of 20 Arab countries vote to send
troops to help defend Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The 
leaders reiterate their condemnation o f the Iraqi attack, the buildup
of troops on the Saudi border, and call for the return o f Kuwait’s 
legitimate government.
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August 12....................Telephone poll: August 9 -10: Bush recieves a 73% approval
rating over his handling o f the crisis in the Persian Gulf.
...................... President Bush orders the U.S. miltary to block exports o f Iraqi oil
and all imports to Iraq except food, stating that the action was in 
accordance with and a compliment to the U.N. imposed sanctions.
...................... Saddam Hussein suggests he might withdraw from Kuwait if  Syria
pulled out o f Lebanon and Israel withdraw from the Golan Heights, 
West Bank, and Gaza. He also calls for foreign troops in Saudi 
Arabia to be replace by Arab forces under U.N. auspices. He calls 
for the implementation o f U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and a halt 
to all resolutions imposed on Iraq after August
August 13...................U.N. Secretary General de Cuellar states that only the United
Nations, through the Security Council, could decide to impose a 
blockade.
August 14...................Iraq and Iran reestablish diplomatic ties.
August 15...................President Bush tells Pentagon employees that American freedom
and “our way of life” would suffer if  Saddam Hussein ever gained 
control o f Saudi Arabian oil reserves.
August 18....................The U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 664 demanding that
Iraq release all foreigners detained in Kuwait and Iraq.
August 19...................Saddam Hussein said he would free the detainees (estimated at
100,000) if the U.S. agreed to withdraw from the area, the 
economic sanctions were lifted, and the U.S. pledged not to attack 
Iraq. He wanted the U.S. pledge backed by the United Nations.
August 2 0 ...................President Bush refers to the Westerners detained in Iraq and
Kuwait as “hostages”.
August 2 5 ...................The United Nations gives force to the blockade o f Iraq with the
approval by the Security Council o f U.N. Resolution 665. The
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resolution allows U.S. and other nations to halt shipping to and 
from Iraq.
September 4 ................Secretary of State Baker tells Congress the Bush administration is
planning a long-term military presence in the Persian Gulf even if 
Iraq withdraws from Kuwait. He outlines a “new regional security 
structure” to counter future Iraqi military potential. Baker states 
that the arrangement would probably include an arms boycott of 
Iraq, further arming of the other Arab states, and a U.S. naval and 
land force in the area. Baker says the structure would be similar to 
NATO.
September 5 .............. Secretary o f State Baker backs off from the remarks he made the
previous day. Baker’s remarks elicited criticisms that the United 
States was attempting to establish a U.S.-dominated alliance in the 
region that could ultimately ignite more instability in the region.
September 7 .............. Bush and Gorbechev summit meeting begins in Helsinki. The two
leaders proclaim that nothing short o f the implementation o f all 
U.N. Security Council resolutions will resolve this crisis.
September 1 0 ............ President Bush drops lonstanding opposition to Soviet
involevement in the peace process.
September 1 1 ............ Bush reaffirms his determination to drive Iraq out o f Kuwait. His
“Iraq will not be permitted to annex Kuwait” speech before a joint 
session o f Congress sends a strong, clear message to Saddam 
Hussein that the United States will use force, if necessary, to push 
Iraq out o f Kuwait; and, prepares the American public to the 
possibiltv of w ar.
.................Members o f the Senate Armed Services Committee question the
administration about who would control foreign contributions to 
the war and that pledges alone were not enough.
September 1 2 .............Iran’s supreme religious leader calls on all Moslems to fight the
U.S. deployment ot the Persian Gulf.
............... President Bush sends videataped message to Iraqi people.
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September 1 3 .............U.N. Security Council passes Reolution 666 which imposes strict
controls on humanitarian food aid to Kuwait.
September 1 6 .............Videotape from Bush tells Iraqi people that their leaders have
brought them to the “brink of war”.
................U.N. Security Council votes unamimously to condemn Baghdad
for violence against embassies and diplomatic personnel in 
occupied Kuwait (United Nations Resolution 667), and promises 
new steps to tighen embargo against Iraq.
September 2 1 ............President Bush tells congressional leaders the destruction taking
place in Kuwait would make it difficult to adhere to the use o f 
sanctions alone to force an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
September 2 2 ............ Iraqi issues statement urging its citizens to prepare for the “mother
of all battles” and backs it up by expelling Egyptian and West 
European diplomats from Baghdad.
September 2 3 ............ Iraq states it will attack Saudi Arabian oil fields and Israel if  it
were “strangled” by economic sanctions.
September 2 4 ............ The U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 669 which orders the
sanctions committee to examine aid requests from countries 
adversely affected by the embargo o f Iraq.
September 2 5 ............ U.N. Resolution 670 passes and establishes an air embargo on Iraq
and occupied Kuwait.
September 2 7 ............ President Bush affirms that the United States would certainly
respond with military action if  Iraq should sanction a major 
terrorist attack, harm hostages, or attack a U.S. warship or aircraft.
.................House Armed Sevices Committee passes a resolution endorsing
Bush’s handling of the crisis, but carefully avoid giving him open- 
ended support for military action against Kuwait.
September 28 Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, says Kuwait’s 
“systematic destruction” under Iraqi occupation is shortening the 
time the U.S. can wait before using military force.
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.................According to intelligence reports, Iraq has developed biological
weapons.
September 3 0 .............The Washington Post reports some U.S. and Gulf officials are
worried that even if the four objectives established by President 
Bush are achieved, it would be a “hollow victory” because it would 
leave Saddam Hussein in power and his military intact.
October 1.....................President Bush addresses the United Nations General Assembly
emphasizing that he still hoped there might be a diplomatic 
solution to the Persian Gulf crisis. Bush appears to be taking a step 
back from the harsh tone he had been using.
October 3 .....................Yevgeny Primakov, a senior Soviet official, meets with Iraqi
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.
October 5 .....................Sabah Salot Kadrot, Iraq’s spokeman at the U.N., accuses the
United States and its allies o f “western imperialism”. He offers no 
indication that Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait.
October 8 .....................19 Arabs killed and 100 wounded during an hour-long struggle
between Israeli police and thousands o f Arabs hurling rocks at 
Jews worshipping at the A1 Aka Mosque in Jerusalem.
October 9 .....................The United States, attempting to maintain support o f Arab
countries, calls for the U.N. Security Council to condemn Israel for 
using excessive force at the A1 Aka Mosque.
October 13...................U.N. Security Council votes unanimously to condemn Israel.
Bush’s approval rating drops due to the sluggish U.S. economy and 
the standoff in the Persian Gulf.
October 16.................... Iraqis hint at the possibility o f compromise, but the U.S. rejects the
terms saying that there will be no linkage to the withdrawal o f Iraq 
from Kuwait. The withdrawal must be unconditional.
October 17...................Senate Foreign Relations Committee demands that the Bush
administration obtain congresssional approval before initiating any 
military action. Secretary o f State Baker responds to the sharp
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exchange stating the administration would “consult” Congress, but 
did not feel obliged to get advance approval for the use o f force.
October 29..................The Bush administration gives Saddam Hussein an explicit
warning that the United States would not shrink from the “use o f 
force” if he continued to occupy Kuwait.
November 6 ................1990 Congressional Elections.
November 8 ................President Bush orders more than 150,000 additional American
ground, sea, and air forces to the Persian Gulf theater o f operations, 
saying they were needed to provide “an adequate offensive military
option” to drive Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The plan is to have 
380,000 American troops in place by early 1991. Bush hopes this 
show of force would send an unmistakable message to Saddam 
Hussein that the United States had the will to go war, would soon 
have the means to go to war, and that a war, if  it came, would 
inflict terrible damage on Iraq.
November 9 ................Secretary o f Defense Cheney reports that the Pentagon was no
longer planning to rotate the troops in the Persian Gulf region. 
Many fear that President Bush is shortening the timetable for 
ending the standoff.
November 10..............The Chairman o f the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator
Sam Nunn, Harshly criticizes the administration’s plan not to
rotate troops in the Persian Gulf region. He says the dropping of 
the troop rotation plan is a clear indication of the administration’s 
decision to speed up the timetable for resolving the crisis.
................The Washington Post reports that some Saudi officials indicated
that in the event of a war with Iraq, Iraq’s military capability 
should not be totally destroyed because Baghdad provided the 
strongest Arab deterrent to Iran and Israel. However, the Saudi 
officials wanted Hussein removed from power and Iraq’s capability 
to threaten its Arab neighbors destroyed.
November 15.............. President Bush, in a CNN interview, states that the withdrawal of
Iraqi troops from Kuwait should be followed by a United Nation’s
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effort guaranteeing the elimination o f Iraq’s chemical weapons 
arsenal and a halt to its nuclear development program.
November 17............. In an address to the opening session o f the Jordanian parliament,
King Hussein criticizes the “double-standard attitude” o f the 
nations claiming to uphold international law in the Gulf while 
ignoring the plight of the Palestinians living under Israeli 
occupation.
November 20............. 45 Democrats from the House of Representatives file a lawsuit
attempting to prevent President Bush from taking offensive 
military action againt Iraq before obtaining authorization from 
Congress.
November 25 .............The Bush administration steps up its efforts to raise American
concern about Iraq’s ability to develop nuclear weapons, saying 
Baghdad might be able to develop the capability within the year. 
Secretary o f Defense Cheney and Brent Scowcroft, the National 
Security Advisor, state in separate appearances that Iraq’s nuclear 
weapons development was continuing despite the embargo.
November 28 ............. U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 677 condemning Iraq for
trying to change the demographics of Kuwait. The Secretary 
General is tasked to safeguard a pre-invasion population register 
from Kuwait.
November 29............. The United Nations Security Council votes 12 to 2 with t
abstention authorizing the United States and coalition forces to 
use “all means available” to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait if 
Saddam Hussein does not withdraw his forces by January 15. 
1991. U.N. Resolution 678 is an explicit authorization to use 
force.
November 30 ............. President Bush offers to have Secretary o f State Baker travel to
Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein.
December 6 ................Saddam Hussein promises to release all the hostages in Iraq and
occupied Kuwait. Bush responds by saying the release o f the 
hostages will not change his position that Iraq comply 100%, 
without condition, with all U.N. resolutions.
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December 9 ................ Iraq releases the hostages from Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
1991
January 9 .................... Secretary o f State James Baker, III meets with Iraqi Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva. After nearly seven hours, Baker 
makes it clear that he discerned no evidence whatsoever that Iraq 
was willing to comply with the international community’s demand 
to withdraw from Kuwait in compliance with U.N. resolutions.
January 11 .................. United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar makes an
eleventh hour appeal to Saddam Hussein in Baghdad with the hope 
he would agree to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait and 
comply with the 12 U.N. resolutions.
January 12 .................. Congress votes to give President Bush the authority  to go to
w ar against I ra q . By a vote o f 52 to 47, the Senate approves the 
use of military force. In the House, the vote was 250 to 183 in 
favor o f the Authorization For The Use O f Force Resolution 
(House Joint Resolution 77, Public Law 102-1).
January 14...................President Bush signs House Joint Resolution 77 into law.
January 15...................United Nation deadline expires. Saddam  Hussein rem ains in
K uwait.
January 16 ...................Coalition a ir forces begin attacks on m ilitary tagets in Iraq  and
K uwait. “This military action, taken in accord with United
Nations resolutions and with the consent of the United State 
Congress, follows months of constant and virtually endless 
diplomatice activity on the part o f the United Nations, the United 
States, and many, many other countries.” (President Bush in a 
televised speech).
January 17................... The New York Times reports that in a January 12th meeting
between Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and Israeli Prime 
Minister Yitzak Shamir, Shamir assured Eagleburger that Israel 
would consult with the United States before retaliating against Iraq 
and that Israel’s response would be based on the extent of the
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damage, the effectiveness o f U.S. efforts to destroy Iraqi SCUD 
launchers, and the ramifications on long-term deterrence o f not 
responding.
January 19 ...................At least two Patriot missile systems are installed in Israel and are
to be staffed by U.S. personnel until the Israelis are trained in their 
use.
.................... After extensive talks with President Bush, Prime Minister Shamir
agrees, for the second time, to delay a retaliatory strike on Iraq, 
saying that Israel would wait to test the effectiveness o f the new 
Patriot missile batteries and allied attacks on enemy positions in 
western Iraq.
.................... Foreign correspondents are ordered to leave Iraq. Peter Arnett of
CNN is allowed to stay because of CNN’s “proven impartiality”.
January 2 0 ...................General Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief o f all allied forces in
the Persian Gulf, announces that allied planes had “thoroughly 
damaged” Iraqi nuclear reactors, and chemical and biological 
weapons factories.
.................... For the second time in two weeks, Deputy Secretary o f State
Eagleburger meets with Prime Minister Shamir in Israel. (The 
United States is making top priority its effort to keep Israel out of 
the military equation. President Bush realizes the backlash from 
Arab countries could destroy the fragile coalition he so skillfully 
built.)
January 2 2 ...................The U.S.-led military command implements press restrictions
requiring reporters to work in press pools under military escort and 
to submit all reports to military censors. (The press is not happy.)
.................... Israel requests an additional $13 billion in U.S. aid to cover the
costs of the Gulf War and absorbing the large influx o f Soviet 
Jews.
January 23 Israeli officials state that the political benefits o f not retaliating 
against Iraq outweigh the potential benefits o f a military strike.
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January 2 5 ...................Saudi and U.S. spokesmen report that oil has been gushing from
the Sea Island Terminal causing a huge oil slick. Officials accuse 
Iraq of intentionally causing the spill, hoping the oil slick would 
threaten Saudi desalination facilities and inhibit an amphibious 
landing.
January 2 6 .................. Iraqi fighter aircraft begin landing in Iran causing much concern
and confusion. Iran reiterates its neutrality stating it will impound 
the Iraqi aircraft until the conflict has been resolved.
January 2 7 ...................United States F-l 1 Is bomb oil manifolds at the Sea Island
Terminal and are successful in stopping the massive oil spill in the 
Persian Gulf. Saudi officials estimate that 11 million barrels of 
crude oil had spilled, making it the largest oil slick to date.
January 3 0 ...................The Bush administration outlines four areas to be addressed in the
post-war peace efforts: economic issues, regional security, arms 
control, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.
February 6 ...................Secretary o f State Baker, speaking before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, states that any post-war settlement would have 
to be built on “five pillars” : a new security arrangement in the 
Gulf, an arms control agreement, a program of economic 
reconstruction “to ease the tension between the haves and the have- 
nots”, a renewed effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli and Israeli- 
Palestinian conflicts, and a domestic effort to reduce American 
dependence on foreign oil.
...................... In a televised speech, King Hussein o f Jordan asserts that the real
agenda of the U.S.-led coalition was to “destroy and reorganize the 
area in amanner far more dangerous to (Arab and Muslim) people 
than the Sykes-Pinot agreement” . He calls for “immediate and 
serious” efforts to impose a ceasefire and establish a “responsible 
dialogue” between Iraq and the United States.
February 7 ................... State Department spokesman Tutwiler announces U.S. plans to
reassess the amount o f Jordan’s economic aid for fiscal year 1992 
in light of King Hussein’s public stance toward the war.
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February 9 .................. In a TASS report, Gorbachev warns that allied actions in the
Persian Gulf war were threatening to exceed the mandate o f United 
Nations resolutions.
February 13................More than 400 Iraqis are killed when allied planes bomb what
Baghdad claim was a civilian bomb shelter. U.S. officials assert 
that their evidence showed the building to be a command and 
control facility.
February 15................ Iraq issues a “statement o f terms for peace” in which it agreed to
implement U.N. Resolution 660 (unconditional withdrawal from 
Kuwait) in exchange for a comprehensive ceasefire and the
cancellation o f the remaining resolutions, the total withdrawal of 
all allied forces from the Gulf region, Israeli withdrawal from Arab 
lands, and a guarantee o f Iraq’s sovereign rights.
President Bush flatly rejects the Iraqi proposal calling it a “cruel 
hoax”. The President also encourages a civil uprising and the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
February 17................Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz meets with President Gorbachev
to discuss diplomatic options for resolving the conflict.
February 18 ................Foreign Minister Aziz leaves Moscow with an undisclosed Soviet
peace proposal.
February 19................President Bush says the Soviet plan fell “well short” o f  what would
be required to stop the war.
February 2 1 ................ Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz delivers Iraq’s terms o f acceptance of
the Soviet peace plan to Moscow: an Iraqi withdrawal starting two 
days after a ceasefire, and continuing for an unspecified time, 
taking place under the supervision o f U.N. countries not currently 
involved in the hostilities; the cancellation o f the economic 
embargo when two thirds o f the Iraqi troops are out o f Kuwait; 
and, the cancellation of the remaining U.N. resolutions when the 
withdrawal was complete. Allied POWs would be released at the 
time the ceasefire begins.
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February 2 2 ................ President Bush warns Iraq that allied troops would launch a
massive ground attack in 24 hours, at 12 noon EST, unless Iraqi 
troops had begun a withdrawal. Hussein was given 48 hours to 
evacuate Kuwait City and one week to be completely out of 
Kuwait.
.................... The Iraqi government denounces the U.S. plan calling it
“shameful”.
.................... The Pentagon reports that Iraq had set at least 100 oil wells on fire
during the preceding 24 hours.
February 2 3 ................Shortly after the deadline (12 noon EST1. more than 700.000
allied troops launch a ground offenisve into Kuwait and Iraq.
February 2 4 ................Allied forces take more than 10,000 Iraqi prisoners, most
surrending voluntarily.
February 2 6 ................ Iraqi President Saddam Hussein announces that the withdrawal
from Kuwait had begun and would be complete by the end o f the 
day.
................... President Bush responds by saying allied troops would continue to
attack Iraqi forces that he said were retreating rather than 
withdrawing. Bush demands that Hussein unconditionally 
surrender, renounce the claims on Kuwait, and comply with the 12 
United Nation resolutions.
February 2 7 ................President Bush announces the allied forces had been successful
in liberating Kuwait and defeating the Iraqi army, and orders 
the allied forces to suspend all attacks as of midnight EST. 100 
hours after the ground offensive began. Bush said a permanent 
ceasefire was contingent upon Iraq’s willingness to comply with all 
12 U.N. resolutions, return all POWs and detained Kuwaiti 
citizens, and provide maps of all land and sea mines.
February 2 8 ................Six weeks after the hostilities in the Persian Gulf began, at 12
midnight EST, a truce is implemented. Iraq agrees to follow all 12 
U.N. resolutions and to send military commanders to arrange the 
details of the ceasefire. Allied commanders state that, in addition
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to the conditions presented by President Bush on February 27, 
allied troops would not leave Iraq and Kuwait until Iraq agreed to 
the destruction of tanks and other Iraqi military equipment left on 
the battlefield.
March 2 ....................... Eleven members of the U.N. Security Council vote in support
of Resolution 686 calling on Iraq to release all POWs and 
detainees, return all stolen property, accept liability for war 
damages, rescind the annexation of Kuwait, and provide maps 
of all mine fields to secure a formal end to the war.
March 3 .........................U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf and Saudi General Kahlid bin
Sultan meet with an eight-member Iraqi delegation and agree to the 
terms for a temporary ceasefire.
....................... Iraq announces its acceptance o f United Nation Resolution 686.
March 4 ...................... Uprisings by the Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south are
causing the most serious civil unrest Hussein has ever had to deal 
with.
March 5 ...................... Iraq annuls its annexation o f Kuwait and agrees to release stolen
Kuwaiti assets.
March 7 ...................... The first allied soldiers leave the Persian Gulf.
March 13 .................... President Bush claims that Iraq’s use o f combat helicopters
violated the terms of the ceasfire and warns Iraq against their 
continued use against anti-government forces.
March 2 2 .................... The United States Congress votes to rescind $55 million in aid to
Jordan, against strenuous objections from the White House, to 
demonstrate displeasure with Jordan’s seeming support o f Iraq 
during the war.
March 2 6 .................... Marlin Fitzwater, White House spokesman, asserts that the United
States would not involve itself in Iraq’s internal strife despite 
alleged violations o f a U.S. warning not to use combat helicopters 
against the rebel.
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March 2 7 .................... Kurdish leader Talabani issues an urgent request to the coalition
countries to send food and aid to the Kurdish-held northern region 
o f Iraq. Iraqi troops had allegedly blocked food shipments from 
the south.
April 1 .........................Massud Barzani, head o f the Kurdish Deomcratic Party in Iraq,
reports that 3 million Iraqi Kurds had fled into the mountains o f 
northern Iraq to escape attacks from government forces.
April 2 .........................Turkish President Ozal calls for an emegency meeting o f the U.N.
Security Council to address the developing Kurdish refugee crisis.
April 3 ......................... U.N. Security Council approves Resolution 687 calling fo r a
perm anent ceasefire and an increm ental term ination of 
sanctions against Iraq  in exchange for Iraqi concessions to 
include: renouncing terrorism, paying compensation for damage
caused by its occupation o f Kuwait, accepting the 1963 border 
agreements with Kuwait, allowing the destruction o f all chemical 
and biological weapons, the destruction o f all SCUD and ballistic 
missiles, and pledging not to aquire such weapons in the future.
April 5 ......................... U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 is approved. The resolution
condemns the Iraqi government’s oppression o f the Kurds and calls 
upon the Secretary General to investigate the situation in northern 
Iraq.
...........................President Bush orders the U.S. Air Force to airdrop food,
medicine, and blankets to Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq.
April 6 .........................I raq  formally accepts U.N. Resolution 687.
...........................The Bush administration warns Saddam Hussein not to undertake
any military operations north of the thirty-sixth parallel.
April 7 ......................... Iran closes its borders after accepting almost 500,000 Kurdish
refugees fleeing Iraq.
............................Secretary o f State Baker visits Kurdish refugee camps in Turkey.
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............................ In a speech broadcast on Baghdad radio, Saddam Hussein
announces the defeat of the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in 
the south.
April 8 ......................... U.S. forces begin withdrawing from southern Iraq.
April 9 ......................... The United Nations Security Council agrees to send the U.N. Iraq-
Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), a 1,440 member observer 
force to patrol the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait.
April 11....................... The United Nations formally declares a perm anent ceasefire.
bringing the Persian G ulf W ar to an end.
.........................President Bush announces the establishment o f “informal safe
havens” in northern Iraq where aid would be disbursed to refugees 
inside Iraq. Bush warns Saddam Hussein not to interfere with the 
humanitarian efforts.
April 12....................... The U.S. military initiate Operation Provide Comfort, a relief aid
campaign in northern Iraq intended to provide food and temporary 
shelter for 700,000 refugees until other relief agencies can take 
over.
April 14....................... United State miltary forces begin to withdraw from the temporary
ceasefire line to the permanent DMZ as required by the U.N.- 
declared ceasefire as outlined in U.N. Resolution 687.
APPENDIX THREE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 
CONCERNING THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT
RESOLUTION # DATE PASSED
660 August 2, 1990
661 August 6, 1990
662 August 9, 1990
664 August 18, 1990
665 August 25, 1990
666 September 13, 1990
667 September 16, 1990
669 September 24, 1990
CONTENT
Condemns Iraqi invasion o f Kuwait. 
Demands an unconditional and immediate 
withdrawal from Kuwait.
Orders a far-reaching trade and financial 
boycott o f Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
Declares Iraq’s formal annexation o f Kuwait 
null and void.
Demands Iraq free all detained foreigners 
and warns o f military action if  they are not 
released.
Allows U.S. and other allied ships to halt 
shipping to and from Iraq.
Sets tight limits on humanitarian food 
supplies sent to Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
Condemns Baghdad’s violence against 
foreign embassies and diplomatic personnel 
in occupied Kuwait.
Entrusts U.N. Sanctions Committee to 
evaluate requests for assistance from 








September 25, 1990 Prohibits all non-humanitarian air traffic 
into and out o f  Iraq and Kuwait. 
CONTENTDATE PASSED
October 29, 1990 Condemns Iraq for human rights violations.
November 28, 1990 Asks U.N. Secretary General to safeguard a 
smuggled copy o f Kuwait’s pre-invasion 
population register.
November 29, 1990 Empowers coalition forces to “use all 
necessary means” to expel Iraq from 
Kuwait. Sets January 15, 1991 deadline for 
withdrawal.
686 March 2, 1991
687 April 3, 1991
Calls on Iraq to release all POWs and 
Kuwaiti prisoners, return all stolen property, 
accept liability for war damages, rescind its 
annexation o f Kuwait, and provide maps of 
all ground and sea mine fields in order to 
secure a formal end to the war. The 
resolution maintains the economic and 
military embargo against Iraq indefinitely.
Declares a permanent ceasefire and calls for 
the incremental termination fo sanctions 
against Iraq in exchange for Iraqi 
concessions to include: renouncing 
terrorism, paying compensation for the 
damage caused by its occupation o f Kuwait, 
allowing the destruction o f all chemical and 
biological weapons, allowing the destruction 
o f all SCUD and ballistic missiles, and 
pledging not to aquire such missiles in the 
future.
688 April 5, 1991 Condemns the Iraqi government’s 
oppression o f the Kurds. Calls for the 
Secretary General to invesitgate.
APPENDIX FOUR
THE DECISION MAKERS: THE VIETNAM WAR
The Truman Administration:




John Foster D ulles-------------------------------
The Kennedy/Johnson Administrations:
John F. Kennedy, Jr.-----------------------------
Lyndon B .Johnson------------------------------
Robert F. Kennedy
Dean R u sk ---------
Robert McNamara 
McGeorge Bundy - 
William Bundy —
President of the United States 
Secretary o f State
President o f the United States 
Secretary of State
President o f the United States
Vice President o f the United States( 1961-63)
President o f the United States( 1963-68)
Attorney General
Secretary of State
Secretary o f Defense
National Security Advisor
Assistant Secretary o f Defense
144
The Kcnncdy/Johnson Administrations (Cont.):
General Maxwell Taylor------------------------- President’s Miltary Advisor (Kennedy)
----------------------------Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Johnson)
Clark Clifford----------------------------------------Secretary o f Defense (Johnson)
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General H. Norman Schwarzkopf
President o f the United States 
Vice President o f the United States 
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